Problems of COMMUNISM

Survey of Soviet Science

EUGENE RABINOWITCH

Ideology and Power Politics

A SYMPOSIUM

China's Population Problem

E. S. KIRBY

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The Editors, Problems of Communism
United States Information Agency
1728 L St. NW.
Washington 25, D.C.

The Soviet Union

Soviet Science—A Survey, *by Eugene Rabinowitch* 1

Marxism-Leninism

Ideology and Power Politics: A Symposium
The Importance of Doctrine, *by R. N. Carew Hunt* 10
National Interest: Key to Soviet Politics, *by Samuel L. Sharp* 15
The Logic of One-Party Rule, *by Richard Lowenthal* 21
Soviet Ideologues on the Treadmill, *by J. L. H. Keep* 30

China

Peiping's Growing Dilemma—Population, *by E. S. Kirby* 36

Book Reviews

Soviet Education—Four Studies
Books by Nicholas DeWitt, Alexander G. Korol, George S. Counts, George L. Kline, reviewed by *Norton T. Dodge* 42
Myron Rush: *The Rise of Khrushchev*, reviewed by *Daniel Bell* 47
Alexander Dallin: *German Rule in Russia, 1941–45*, reviewed by *Hans Kohn* 51

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Soviet Science—A Survey

By Eugene Rabinowitch

THE RECENT OUTSTANDING successes of Soviet technology and science can be baffling only to those who forget that Russia has had a long and honorable tradition of scientific achievement dating back to the early eighteenth century. The most famous of early Russian scientists was Mikhail Lomonosov (1711–1765), who was instrumental in making the Russian Academy of Sciences, founded by Peter the Great in 1724, a great and justly renowned scientific institution. He was the precursor of many other men whose contributions in the succeeding two centuries placed Russia prominently on the scientific map of Europe.

Lobachevsky and Chebyshev in mathematics, Mendeleyev in chemistry, Lebedev in physics, Ivanovsky—discoverer of the first virus—in plant physiology, Dokuchaev and Pryanishnikov who originated soil science, Zhukovsky who pioneered in aerodynamic research, Pavlov and Mechnikov whose contributions in biology and medicine were rewarded with the Nobel Prize—all these names surely testify to the fact that Russia could match the most advanced countries in Western Europe in its achievements in many fields of scientific endeavor.

To be sure, after the mid-nineteenth century the backwardness of Russia's ruling classes hindered and delayed progress in academic and applied science. The best scientific minds had to work in small, poorly equipped laboratories with little official encouragement. Nor did the growing conflicts between the reactionary government and the liberal intelligentsia fail to touch the scientists. Many prominent ones, among them Mechnikov, Sophia Kovalevskaia and Bakh, went abroad. Even the conservative-minded Mendeleyev had his share of troubles with the government over academic freedom and the autonomy of the universities.

Nevertheless, when the revolution came, the ground was already well prepared for further scientific advance. A tradition of high-grade, forward-looking research was firmly established at the leading universities—of St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kharkov, Kiev and Kazan—as well as at various technological institutes and specialized military academies. The overthrow of the Tsarist regime encouraged widespread hopes among scholars and intellectuals generally for the advent of a new climate of freedom favorable to academic and scientific progress.

The Early Years

These hopes were soon disappointed. After seizing power from the shortlived democratic provisional government, the Bolsheviks established a dictatorship and proceeded to change everything by force. Laboratories stood empty, without gas, heat or electric power. Students went off to fight in the civil war campaigns. Professors, seeing their cherished dreams of freedom and representative government trampled upon, adopted an attitude of non-cooperation toward the Communist regime. Many scholars fled to the regions still occupied by the Whites, later escaping abroad.

Bolshevik policy, however, soon began to discriminate between the natural sciences on the one hand and the social sciences and humanities on the other.

A distinguished Russian-born scientist and writer, Professor Rabinowitch was for many years associated with various academic and scientific institutions in Germany, Denmark, and Great Britain. Since 1945, he has been Editor of The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, *published at the University of Chicago, and, since 1947, Research Professor of Botany at the University of Illinois. He has written widely in various scientific fields, including reaction kinetics, physical chemistry photo-synthesis, and photochemistry, as well as on scientific-political and social problems.*

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At an early stage the regime proclaimed its intention to foster the advance of science and to stake the future of Communist society upon the power of science to transform the economy. It implemented this intention by offering material inducements and public recognition to scientists, and cooperation by the latter was rendered easier by the fact that it did not entail the same moral capitulation that was required of historians, economists and philosophers. The result was to place scientific talent back in charge of teaching and research.

For the first fifteen years of the Communist regime, science continued to develop under relatively favorable conditions, an oasis of intellectual freedom in the desert of compulsory conformism. The ruling party largely refrained from restricting the choice of subjects of scientific study and the objective interpretation of results. This freedom, coupled with economic encouragement and social recognition, led to a rapid expansion of scientific education. The pent-up desire for knowledge released by the social revolution flooded the classrooms and research laboratories with eager but poorly prepared young men and women aspiring, as the saying went, to bite into the granite of science.

There were, however, numerous difficulties. Apart from the deficiencies in preliminary educational preparation, there was a shortage of trained scientists to serve as teachers. Many had to teach simultaneously at several institutions, often rushing from town to town to do so. The scientific books produced during this period were preponderantly elementary textbooks, and the professional publications reflected the influx of newly-trained scientists, often giving evidence of immaturity and provincialism. Scientific research was frequently hampered also by lack of the simplest laboratory instruments. This resulted, in part, from official pressure on the academic laboratories and research institutes to prove their "usefulness", the demands being carried to the point of requiring them, at one time, not only to produce their own scientific instruments but to turn out machinery for industry.

Little by little, these difficulties were gradually overcome between 1920 and 1930. The quality of high school education was restored, permitting the selection of well-qualified students for scientific study. The science faculties were augmented by an influx of competent graduates. Dependence upon imported scientific instruments was reduced by the creation of a domestic instrument manufacturing industry, which was to develop so successfully that one of the things which most strikes visiting observers today is the lavish equipment of Soviet laboratories.

But while the situation of Soviet science improved rapidly in respect of these material and human factors, another menace loomed in the growing pressure for ideological conformism. Suspicions had already been voiced in the early years of the regime regarding certain scientific theories that were viewed as heretical from the standpoint of dialectical materialism, but such attacks had been sporadic and ineffectual. Thus, the theory of relativity had come under fire, but physicists continued to teach and use it.[1] The situation was less happy in biology, because of its greater vulnerability to the inroads of extra-scientific Marxist dogma. In fact, even before the revolution, certain trends had begun in Russian biology that helped prepare the way for its eventual emasculation under Stalin.

Ideological Inroads

Among those originally responsible for injecting an ideological note into biology was Timiriazev, one of the most influential figures in modern Russian scientific development. An outstanding plant physiologist, Timiriazev was well ahead of his age in the application of physico-chemical principles to biology. But he was also an early devotee of Marxism and one of the few senior scientists who enthusiastically embraced the Bolshevik revolution. When he died soon afterward, he was enshrined as one of the revolution's patron saints, and even now Soviet scientists dare not admit that any of his theories was mistaken. For example, Timiriazev claimed that the absorption maximum in the spectrum of chlorophyll coincided with the energy maximum in the solar spectrum, and he held this alleged coincidence to be striking evidence of Darwinian adaptation of organisms to external conditions. Already in 1883 Engelmann had pointed out the error of Timiriazev's theory, but all Soviet treatises on the subject still hail it as a great "discovery" and proof of Timiriazev's genius.

In one region of biological theory, Soviet ideologists found themselves in agreement with the leading scientific school. Pavlov's theory of conditioned reflexes was considered to fit perfectly into the dialectical theory of the development of higher nervous activity in organisms in response to external chal-

[1] For a discussion of Soviet views regarding the incompatibility between Einstein's theory of relativity and dialectical materialism, see Gustav Wetter, S. J., "Dialectical Materialism and Natural Science," in *Soviet Survey* (London), January–March 1958; also Paul S. Epstein, "The Diamat and Modern Science," *Bulletin of Atomic Physicists* (Chicago), August 1952 (referred to hereafter as *Bulletin*).

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lenges. The old master was therefore given generous support—and even the unique privilege of criticizing the official philosophy in his lectures.

In spite of the stagnation that affected many of the biological disciplines, the first fifteen years of the Communist regime were generally a period of rapid growth and expansion for Russian science. By 1930 scientists were well on their way to becoming a privileged class in Soviet society not only in respect of economic status, but also of freedom to choose their field of work, to publish their research findings in Russian and foreign journals, and to maintain contacts with foreign scientists, including the privilege to travel and work abroad. All through the 1920's and early 1930's, Soviet scientists were permitted to spend months and even years working in the leading laboratories of Germany and England. Foreign scholars were invited to scientific conferences in the Soviet Union and lavishly entertained; some prominent ones went to the USSR to work—for example, the American geneticists, H. J. Muller and R. Goldschmidt, who contributed a great deal to the development of a flourishing Russian school of genetics.

One of the Soviet scientists who worked abroad in this period was Peter Kapitsa, a promising young physicist. Taken to England by his professor to get over a crisis in his personal life, he was permitted to stay more than ten years at Cambridge, where he rapidly acquired an outstanding reputation in low-temperature research. Several times he made temporary trips back to the Soviet Union to attend scientific meetings; in 1935, during one of these visits, it was announced that he had decided to stay in Moscow. He was never again seen abroad, and the Soviet government later purchased his laboratory equipment in Cambridge so that he might continue his work in Moscow. Another outstanding young theoretical physicist of this period, George Gamov, managed to remain abroad permanently, first in Denmark and later in America, where he is now well known among scholars as an astrophysicist, and to the public as a popular science writer.

The Destruction of a Science

Gamov's departure in 1933 was one of the signs that the honeymoon between Russian science and the Soviet regime was over. With the consolidation of Stalin's personal dictatorship, terror—which until then had been confined, more or less, to the political arena—invaded other areas as well. As in domestic and foreign policy, so in science and art the personal whims, views and phobias of the omnipotent dictator became decisive. In art, only things pleasurable to Stalin's eye, or melodious to his ear, were tolerated; in science, it was Stalin who decided whether Marr's theories of the origin of languages, or Mendel's laws of genetics, or Pauling's theories of resonance in chemistry were in agreement with dialectical materialism.[2]

The best known case history of Stalin's personal intervention in science was, of course, the destruction of genetics, with the role of executioner played by the self-made selectionist, Trofim Lysenko. The official motivation for Lysenko's campaign against scientific genetics was as absurd as it was invalid. Briefly, genetics teaches that species can be changed only by selection of the few desirable mutations among many random ones; the number of mutations can be in-

Shades of the Past?

The dividing line between materialism and idealism in biology is the method of and approach to the study of living bodies, of phenomena of living nature, and the understanding and interpretation of them. The philosophy of Michurinist biologists is dialectical materialism, and the philosophy of the opponents of the materialist, Michurinist teaching is anything but a philosophy of consistent materialism.

In order not to swerve from the materialist path, Michurinist biologists, in solving problems of theory, proceed from the interests and needs of practice and try to create possibilities for solving various problems of importance to practice. Herein lies the unity of theory and practice. Without such unity theoretical biological research loses objectivity and purposefulness, and researchers slip into the swamp of idealism and scholasticism. Such scholasticism muddles even already clear theoretical questions and blocks the way to further effective research, to the discovery of truth. . . .

The party and the government have created and are creating in our country everything necessary for even greater development of science. One may be confident that the future of materialist biology in our country will be even brighter, even more fruitful, than its glorious past.

—T. Lysenko in* Izvestia, *Dec. 8, 1957.

[2] On Marr's linguistic theories, see J. Kucera, "The Linguistic Controversy," *Problems of Communism*, No. 2, March–April 1954; on Pauling's theories vs. dialectical materialism, see John Turkevich, "Soviet Physics and Chemistry," in *Soviet Science: A Symposium* (Horn-Shafer Co., Baltimore, 1952).

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creased artificially, but it is (at least as yet) impossible to direct them. Therefore, patient selection of progeny through many generations, ultimately producing genetically pure strains, and crossing them to obtain the desirable combination of heritable characters, is needed to produce improved and hereditary stable breeds of plants and animals.

Now, these theories do not seem to fit in with the cardinal assumption of dialectical materialism—namely, that "being determines consciousness," that all phenomena in life can be explained purely in environmental terms. Nor does genetics fit in with the aims of a government which claims to be able to change human nature by altering the economic and political structure of society. Finally, the theories of genetics seemed to imply that the improvement of agricultural plants and animals, so sorely needed by the Soviet state, would not be as rapid as its leaders desired. All of which made it easy for Lysenko to attack genetics as "fatalistic," contrary to the tenets of dialectical materialism, and highly impractical to boot. According to Lysenko, heritable changes can be created to order and on short notice, by changed feeding of plants or animals, by grafts, by selections of individual seeds, or by seed treatment prior to germination. Genetics scoffed at his claims—so genetics had to be suppressed.[3]

Lysenko's campaign reached its climax in August 1948, during a "scholarly" meeting of Soviet biologists, at which he dramatically announced that his theories had been "examined and approved" by the Central Committee of the Communist Party—in other words, by Stalin himself.[4] An orgy of persecution against "academic" geneticists was soon unleashed. Institutes of genetics were closed, textbooks destroyed; professors disappeared from their laboratories. Lysenko was made President of the Lenin Agricultural Academy, founded by Lenin on the insistence of the leading Russian geneticist, N. A. Vavilov. (Vavilov himself had been attacked by Lysenko as early as 1940. At the beginning of the German-Soviet war, he was accused of planning to flee abroad and was deported to Magadan in northeast Siberia, where he soon died.) Within a short time, the young but flourishing school of Russian genetics was totally destroyed.

[3] See Thedosius Dobzhansky, "The Suppression of a Science," *Bulletin*, May 1949; also *Death of a Science in Russia*, by Conway Zirkle (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1949.)

[4] The highlights of the proceedings of the session of the Agricultural Academy can be found in Zirkle, *op. cit.*, and *The Country of the Blind*, by George S. Counts and Nucia Lodge (Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1949), Chapter 9.

At the present time, several years after Stalin's death, the status of genetics in the USSR is still obscure. True, Lysenko was demoted from the presidency of the Agricultural Academy, and his theories have been subjected, now and again, to critical comment by bona fide scientists. Yet Khrushchev has on several occasions gone out of his way to praise Lysenko's abilities, and as recently as last December 8th, *Izvestia* carried Lysenko's article (entitled "Theoretical Successes of Agronomic Biology") which boldly repeated all his former claims and prevarications. Whatever Lysenko's personal position at the present time, the fact remains that very few of the Russian geneticists survived the reign of terror, and the surviving ones have given scant indication of having resumed their work.

The Scientists' Dilemma

The saddest aspect of the persecution of genetics was that distinguished scientists were used as tools of Stalin's purge. The president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences at that time was S. I. Vavilov, younger brother of the geneticist and himself an outstanding physicist with considerable achievements in physical and physiological optics. A believer in true science, a liberal European in his philosophy, an admirer of his older brother, he had to sign orders for the destruction of his brother's life work and the purge of his pupils. He had to praise publicly the quackery of Lysenko and the scientific genius of Lysenko's patron in the Kremlin.[5]

Western scientists are apt to ask of Vavilov, and others like him: if they could not rebel, could they not at least resign? Was it only fear of the dictator which caused them to deny their principles, and to forget their personal attachments? Or were the glitter and economic rewards of the presidency of the Soviet Academy sufficient to buy a man's conscience? Or did the prospect of leadership in the broad expansion of scientific work for the benefit of one's country lead to a rationalization which made capitulation in any single area appear justified? Was solace provided by the hope that, by remaining in an exposed position and offering oneself as willing executioner of the dictator's orders, one could protect other victims, and thus soften the blows? Would it not have meant opening the door to greater evil to withdraw and let the presidency of the Academy be taken over by an adventurer like Lysenko—perhaps Lysenko himself?

[5] See Eric Ashby, *A Scientist in Russia*, Penguin Books, New York, 1947.

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It is difficult for those who did not experience the debilitating pressure and the moral dilemmas of life under terror to comprehend the rationalizations (and self-deceptions) which permit men to carry on under these conditions. We cannot but wonder how intellectual and scientific life could continue at all and bear fruit, in daily expectation of arrest, deportation and death, in constant dissimulation of one's true feelings and convictions.

The historic fact is that Soviet science *did* function and bear fruit even during the darkest days of Stalin's terror. True, genetics was wiped out. The blight soon spread into other branches of biology and for a while invaded some sectors of physics and chemistry.[6] From his vantage point as president of the Agricultural Academy, member of the Academy of Sciences, director of a great research institute, boss of all Agricultural Research Stations and protégé of the almighty dictator, Lysenko threatened to become the master of biology (if not of all science) in the USSR. Distinguished physiologists and embryologists—Orbeli, Shmalgauzen and others—were censured and made to recant in public. Strict "Pavlovism" was proclaimed obligatory in the physiology of the nervous system, and in psychology.[7] The quackery of Madame Lepeshinskaia, who claimed to have proved the existence of extracellular "living matter", was rewarded with a Stalin prize.[8]

Physicists Under Fire

In physics, the most persistent attack was directed against the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics—the indeterminancy principle of Heisenberg, the complementarity concept of Bohr. The tendency of many modern theoretical physicists to discard the concept of "reality" of physical phenomena, and replace it by a system of mathematical relations between "observables", was a challenge to dialectic materialism, which is based on belief in the inherent capacity of the human mind to perceive the realities of the physical world (and on the narrow 19th-century postulate that these realities must consist entirely of different "modes of motion" of matter). Many physicists in the West, including Einstein, de Broglie and Schroedinger, refused to accept statistical "laws" predicting, within definite limits, the results of practically possible experiments, as an adequate substitute for causal laws connecting real phenomena of nature—on an atomic scale as well as an everyday scale. No wonder that the search for a reinterpretation of quantum mechanics on a strictly causal basis was—and still is—officially encouraged in the Soviet Union.

However, no sustained effort was made to destroy those sharing the prevailing Western ideas in quantum mechanics as thoroughly as the geneticists were destroyed in 1948. True, rejection of the "idealistic Copenhagen school of theoretical physics" (Bohr, Heisenberg, Born and the majority of Western theoretical physicists) became obligatory, and may still be so. Some venerable Soviet physicists—such as Joffe and Frenkel—were taken to task for being lukewarm in their conversion to dialectic materialism, applying it only in the introductory chapters of their books in the hope that censors would not read farther. They had to publish recantations and promise better behavior in the future, but the threat to them, though ominous for a while, subsided in recent years.

The purges, however, did not entirely spare Russian physicists. German-Jewish physicists, who went to Russia after Hitler's ascension to power, were summarily expelled after the Soviet-Nazi rapproachment in 1939; some of them (like Houtermans) were arrested and kept imprisoned for many years. The most brilliant theoretical physicist of the new Soviet generation of scientists, Landau, also went to prison. Khrushchev himself has reportedly stated that the dean of Soviet experimental physicists, Joffe, was on the list of people to be shot in one of the purges, but that his name was crossed out by Stalin because "he may still prove useful to us". According to apparently reliable reports, Kapitsa was punished—allegedly for refusing to take part in work on the atomic bomb—by spending several years under house arrest in the country.

One reason why physics and chemistry have, on the whole, been treated much more gently than biology may have been the vital interest of the Soviet leaders—including Stalin himself—in the contribution these disciplines could make to the military and industrial might of the Soviet Union. They were the hens expected to lay golden eggs, and therefore not to be killed. And useful they did prove. Spurred by material encouragement, by pressure from the political leadership, and by patriotic spirit (which has always been a strong impetus to Russian science, especially during the German invasion of 1942–45), Soviet physicists rapidly mastered the new techniques of nuclear physics. They produced the first Soviet atom bomb in 1949, only four years after Hiroshima. They

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[6] See Turkevich, *op. cit.*

[7] See I. D. London, "Soviet Psychology and Psychiatry," *Bulletin*, August 1952.

[8] See I. D. London, "Toward a Realistic Appraisal of Soviet Science," *Bulletin*, May 1957.

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arrived, almost simultaneously with American scientists, at a practical solution of the problem of thermonuclear explosions. They now hold the lead in the construction of great particle accelerators. Finally, continuing the tradition of Russian pioneering in aerodynamics and ballistics, they stayed well ahead of American development in rocketry and produced, in 1957, the first man-made satellites and the first "intercontinental" missiles.

With this last success, Soviet science has emerged as a great international force, its prestige enormously enhanced. Speculations are rife as to what influence this new force will exert on Soviet society and on the future world policy of the Soviet Union.

Stunted Branches on a Growing Tree

The idea that the Soviet Union may be a hell politically, but a paradise for scientists (at least in some areas) is difficult to accept. True, scientists in the West took this view in the 1920's, but as more and more sciences—and scientists—came under Moscow's fire, as Lysenko trampled over genetics and quantum mechanics was bombarded by the heavy guns of dialectical materialism, even these Western observers began to think that Soviet science faced a hopeless future, that ideological perversion would eventually cripple it, and that freedom of science can never be secure in a country which has no respect for freedom of thought in general. The material and societal inducements offered by the totalitarian dictatorship of the East appeared to be inadequate substitutes for independence of thought and personal freedom offered by the libertarian societies of the West—even if the latter were much less actively interested in science, and much stingier in its support.

However, the discounting of Soviet science in the 1940's was as exaggerated as had been its exaltation in the 1920's. A climate of spiritual freedom is certainly important for the development of science, but so are adequate education and proper support. While the Soviet Union was deficient in the first, it provided plenty of the other two. Discussing the state of Russian science in 1952, during the period of Lysenko's ascendency, this author wrote:

One is left with the impression of a flourishing community stricken by an epidemic. Here and there, houses are closed and quarantined. Nobody knows for certain how to protect himself from the scourge. A certain ritual of pacifying the angry gods is followed. It includes praising their wisdom at the beginning and end of each printed or spoken communication, and loudly denouncing all those stricken by the plague as sinners who have brought it upon themselves. . . . However, as men do in real epidemics—as they did during the war under the bombs—those who are still hale go to work as usual.

And in conclusion:

It is wrong to think of contemporary Soviet science as being largely paralyzed by the ideological dictatorship of ignorant politicians. Some branches may be dead or stunted, but it is still a vigorous, growing tree. Limbs that have been cut off sprout new shoots; those prevented from growing in their natural direction, grow around the obstacle.[9]

There is not much to change in this appraisal now, except that the situation has improved considerably since Stalin's death. The areas of ideological oppression have narrowed, and its intensity decreased. Not that Soviet science is now quite free; far from it. Occasional pressure is still exerted to restrict activity to immediately practical ends; no group of scientists is quite immune from censure for doing things which are deemed of no use to the state. Lysenko continues in the picture as research director and editor of "agri-biological" journals. When Nikita Khrushchev recently proclaimed that the Russian dairy industry would overcome the American lead within a few years, his optimism was based on Lysenko's promise that Russian cows can be induced to double their production of milk—one should add, by means as "scientific" as those which he once promised would transform agricultural plants. Physicists using the principles of relativity, uncertainty, or complementarity are still exposed to ideological heckling. Obeisance to dialectic materialism as the mainspring of all true science remains obligatory. But science, which has weathered the days of Zhdanov and Stalin, will not be stunted by today's much milder forms of control.

A point to be underscored is that science in Russia, even under worst conditions, has been freer than all other areas of intellectual endeavor. Compared to historians and sociologists, economists and writers, who have lived in constant jeopardy, trying to guess what tomorow's party line would be, recanting today what they said yesterday, scientists have been much more their own masters. This has made scientific careers particularly attractive to those among the younger generation who most value their independence. Thus it is erroneous either to compare or to contrast the pressures and restrictions which have impaired the attractiveness of science in the West with the much greater pressures and tighter restrictions in the Soviet system. In America, only a little pressure can cause the most valuable young intellects to seek expression in other fields. In the Soviet Union, much heavier restrictions have not prevented

[9] In *Bulletin*, August 1952.

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science from seeming a haven of intellectual freedom.

It is difficult to decide whether general restrictions on independent thinking and the training of Soviet youth for conformity discourage to any extent truly creative scientific thought (as contrasted to good scientific workmanship). Scientists with revolutionary new ideas are rare under all conditions; it is difficult to apply statistics to such essentially unique phenomena. Does systematic indoctrination in philosophic dogmatism and political docility—the basic feature of instruction in all Soviet schools and colleges—make the appearance of a Darwin, an Einstein or a Lobachevsky less likely? Despite the vast quantitative growth and steadily improving average level of scientific achievement in the Soviet Union, so far, at least, no great new ideas have come from there. Since 1904, when Pavlov won a Nobel award, this prize has gone only once to a Russian scientist: the chemistry prize awarded to N. N. Semenov for his work on chemical chain reactions—a highly creditable but not revolutionary achievement.

In the same period, over twenty Nobel prizes in science have gone to scholars in the United States. The majority of them were for achievements similar to that of Semenov, but in a few cases revolutionary new concepts were involved. An outstanding example was last year's award of the physics prize to two

THE TWO FACES OF SOVIET TECHNOLOGY

The Glorious Future . . .

One "sputnik" to the other: Who's the last one? I'm right after you. (Sputniks' tickets read "Earth to Jupiter," "Earth to Mercury.")

—From *Krokodil*, November 20, 1957.



. . . The Shabby Present

One man to the other: When will you finish this house? Reply: Not much longer; the committee has accepted it already . . .

—From *Krokodil*, September 30, 1957



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young Chinese-American physicists, Yang and Lee, for the overthrow of the parity principle.

Is a similar revolutionary idea less likely to occur to a Soviet scientist because he has been discouraged early in his career from questioning the prevailing concepts? Or will pressure for conformity merely provoke the keenest minds to doubt? Some of the greatest scientific geniuses—Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler—conceived their heterodox ideas despite prevailing pressures to conform. Some competent Soviet scientists seem to have accepted the tenets of dialectic materialism as a matter of conviction, not merely of compunction or convenience; yet it seems a fair guess that there are plenty of Russian scientists—old and young ones alike—who see in the official philosophy only cant, to be used occasionally for self-protection.

Incentives and Motivations

Whether or not the general discouragement of free inquiry in Soviet academic and public life also inhibits the inquiring mind in science, there is no doubt that other forces at work in the Soviet Union are powerfully assisting scientific progress.

In the first place, Soviet secondary education introduces youth to the ideas and techniques of mathematics and science. The curriculum itself—except for the emphasis on ideological studies and the disappearance of classical languages—is not very different from that offered by high schools in prerevolutionary Russia (or for the matter in many other countries now). What is, of course, radically different from prerevolutionary days is the enormous spread of secondary education and the opportunity given to gifted children to qualify for further training in scientific careers.

Two other factors favoring the development of science are more uniquely typical of Soviet society. The first is the prestige with which science is endowed, and which finds expression both in the financial rewards of a successful scientific career and in the high standing of scientists in public opinion. The second is the lavish support the government gives to institutions of higher learning and to research institutes. The facts relevant to these considerations have been widely discussed since the launching of the first satellite: they include the larger numbers of scientific and engineering graduates in the USSR compared to the US; the relatively high salaries and other benefits in science; the conviction of Soviet scientists that "money is there for the asking"—so different from the often precarious financial status of the most important research projects in the United States.

There is another factor which deserves more attention than it has received from the West: that is the Soviet glorification of science as a way to achieve happiness and prosperity for the peoples of the USSR and of the whole world. This faith in science as a creative force in society is, perhaps, even more important in attracting the best minds to science than the expectation of financial rewards and social recognition. Soviet youth grows up in a world of poverty and privation. It is not hard to instill in them the desire to transform society, through science, into something much happier and more prosperous. Small wonder, then, that in publicizing the aims of scientific development, the regime puts less emphasis on the enhancement of Soviet military might than on such attractive and appealing aspects as the exploration of space and inter-planetary travel, which are calculated to arouse the enthusiasm of youth.

While world attention remains glued on Soviet successes in producing thermonuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and space satellites, there is a tendency to forget that this is only one aspect of the broad development of Soviet science. The regime aims at making the USSR, through science and technology, not only the most powerful but also the most productive country in the world, and to induce other nations to accept its technical and scientific help and leadership. It is to this wider aim that the enormous organization of scientific research in Russia is directed.

The direction of this effort is centered in the Soviet Academy of Sciences. In contrast to similar institutions in the US and Western Europe, the Soviet Academy is not merely the leading learned society in the country; it is also the operating agency for much of the research done in the USSR. According to a recent study by A. Vucinich of Stanford University, the Academy now has 118 institutes in the various natural sciences. Besides sixteen local branches of the central academy, there are twelve affiliated academies in the constituent republics of the USSR.[10]

In viewing the work of this vast institute, Western scholars are inclined to note primarily its subordination to party control and to the political aims of the regime. If they are sociologists (like Professor Vucinich), they are impressed by the low scholarly level of the historical, sociological, and economic sections of the Academy, and the subservience in all these fields to the current party line. Attention is called to the hollowness of the autonomy of the Academy, the powerlessness of its supposedly supreme General Assembly, and the influence of its party-dominated Presidium and permanent secretariat.

[10] A. Vucinich, *The Soviet Academy of Sciences*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif., 1956.

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All this is undoubtedly true. However, in most of its important *scientific* functions, the Academy is a highly competent and largely independent body. It is composed of a fair selection of the best minds in Soviet science, including a considerable number of older men with prerevolutionary education. Those who owe their membership to considerations other than scientific prominence (such as Lysenko) are small in number. While Nesmeyanov, the present head of the Academy Presidium, and Topchiev, the chief scientific secretary, are both Communist Party members, they are also prominent scientists, not party hacks or bureaucrats (both are organic chemists).

The academy has been described as the "general staff" of a scientific army, throwing its columns to this or that decisive segment of the "scientific front", in response to the directives of the Communist leadership; in fact, this is the picture that the Presidium itself likes to paint in official reports. Science is visualized as a centrally planned activity; its most spectacular achievements are interpreted as results of planned concentration on a few "targets".

This is only partly true. Efforts in *applied science* can be planned; if considered of national importance, they can be speeded up by a crash program. The United States' "Manhattan Project", which produced the atom bomb in 1945, is an example. It is quite likely that the Soviet space satellites were the result of a similar crash program.

The advance of fundamental science is much more difficult to plan. It has been reported that when the requirement of planning was first imposed on the research institutes, the directors presented, as the "plan of research for the next year", the actual results of the previous year's research in order to assure 100 percent fulfilment.[11] As in other fields, probably a good deal of this type of deceptive manipulation of the plan goes on, but this is not to say that central planning is totally ineffectual. To cite an example, in 1946 a conference was called by the Academy to review the state of photosynthesis research; it was found to be backward, and a decision was taken to promote it. By 1957, a second conference on photosynthesis saw the presentation of about 150 research papers as against ten at the earlier gathering. In a similar way, research in electronic computers and automation has been spurred by resolutions of the Academy.

However, pressures of this type are much more likely to spur progress in fields where Soviet science is recognized as backward compared to the West than in forays into new, unexplored regions. They can bring up the rear, but not lead the van. Resolutions proclaiming the necessity of achieving breakthroughs into unexplored areas of physics or biology are bound to remain mere words until a creative scientific mind shows the way, usually in an unexpected direction.

ALL ATTEMPTS at central planning notwithstanding, the decisive determinant of new achievements in science remains the personal interest and dedication of individual scientists—and this cannot be planned. The recent development of areas of science which require expensive instrumentation and the cooperation of large groups of researchers has not invalidated the fact that science is what individual scientists make it. Particle accelerators were developed in America, not because a central agency had planned it, but because of Ernest Lawrence; Soviet science owes its success in the same area largely to Wechsler. In short, the development of fundamental science in Soviet Russia proceeds in about the same way as in the West, through the interplay of individual talents.

As to the alleged "unevenness" of scientific progress in the Soviet Union, attributed to planned concentration on a few sectors—this again, if true at all, affects *applied* science only. If one takes wide classifications (such as "nuclear physics", "molecular physics", "atomic physics", "organic chemistry", "enzymology", *etc.*) and counts the numbers of papers in these classes published in the USSR and in the United States, one finds a more or less constant ratio, indicating that Soviet science—insofar as broadness of coverage is concerned—has generally caught up with Western science. One does find wide differences in special areas, but differences are easy to find in the scientific record of every country. What is significant is that this kind of statistics, extended over several recent years, reveals continuous increase in the relative contribution of Soviet research to most if not all areas of science—an increase that will probably become more and more conspicuous in the years to come. However, scientific leadership does not consist in numbers—be it numbers of scientists or of scientific papers; it is based, above all, on great individual achievements (Holland and Denmark, for example, have played a role in science out of all proportion to the numbers, not only of their population, but also of their scientists and scientific publications). Whether such achievements will come in increasing numbers from the USSR, because of the growth of its total scientific manpower and resources, or whether they will remain disproportionately small because of the general prevalence of conformism and discouragement of unorthodox thinking, only time can tell.

[11] See Ashby, *op. cit.*

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Ideology and Power Politics: A Symposium

EDITORS' NOTE: Ever since the establishment of the Soviet state, its leaders have unceasingly stressed the importance of the official ideology, Marxism-Leninism (appended, until recently, by "-Stalinism") both as a conceptual tool and as an indispensable "guide to action." Yet at the same time they have not hesitated to overlook the doctrine on many occasions, or to reformulate and even renounce some of its basic tenets.

What, then, is to be made of the official Soviet position on the crucial significance of Marxism-Leninism? More important, how are we to weigh the ideological considerations—whatever they are—which influence Kremlin behavior against the motivating drive of power politics, which surely has played a role in the growth and expansion of the Soviet empire?

These questions, which have occupied the minds of scholars and statesmen for the past few decades, form the subject matter of the present symposium. In the first contribution, Mr. Carew Hunt argues that while *Realpolitik* has often been a "guide" to Soviet "action," the policies and attitudes of the Soviet regime reveal the pervasive, underlying influence of the creed in which the leaders "have been nurtured . . . from birth;" thus, he holds, ideological considerations have frequently outweighed political realism in policy determinations. This view is contested by Mr. Samuel Sharp, who maintains that ideology, whatever its genetic or teleological importance, is of no help in understanding Soviet policy; the Kremlin's short-range (i.e., realistically meaningful) objectives are determined purely by "national interest"—or what the Soviets consider to be their national interest. Mr. Sharp's view is in turn, disputed by Mr. Richard Lowenthal, who develops his own theory of the operative importance of Soviet ideology—that is, an ideology which serves to justify and fortify a totalitarian one-party system, of which it is itself a logical outgrowth. The fourth contribution, by Mr. J. L. H. Keep, is concerned specifically with ideological changes which have occurred since the death of the erstwhile fountainhead of doctrinal purity and wisdom, Joseph Stalin.

In the next issue the contributors to this symposium will have an opportunity to refute each other's views and critiques. Other communications on this problem are welcomed.

The Importance of Doctrine

By R. N. Carew Hunt

THE TERM IDEOLOGY is one which is more often used than defined. As the present study will be concerned with what the Russian Communists, and Communists in general, mean by it, a definition taken from a Soviet source is in order. The *Filosoficheskii Slovar* (Philosophical Dictionary, 1954 ed.), calls ideology "a system of definite views, ideas, conceptions and notions adhered to by some class or political party," and goes on to say that it is always "a reflection of the economic system predominant at any given time." In a class-divided society the ideology will be that of one or another of the struggling classes, but under socialism, when there is no longer any class division, it will be that of society as a whole. A quotation from Lenin is added to the effect that there can be no "middle way" between the ideology of the bourgeoisie and that of the proletariat. The one is false and the other true.

Mr. Carew Hunt is on the faculty of St. Antony's College, Oxford University. He is author of Marxism Past and Present *(1955), and* A Guide to Communist Jargon *(1957), published by Macmillan Co., New York.*

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Such a summation, albeit neat, is not altogether satisfactory. Broadly speaking, Marx was right in contending that the ideology of a society—the complex of ideas which determine its "way of life"— will be that of its dominant class, that is, of those whose abilities (whether used rightly or wrongly is irrelevant in this context) have raised them above the common herd. But this sociological fact applies equally to the Soviet Union, where the party certainly constitutes such a class and indeed is assigned the duty of fertilizing the masses with its ideas. Undoubtedly the current Soviet ideology is intended to strengthen the party and reinforce its claim to rule. But one must probe further to explain why the party should have adopted the particular body of doctrine that it has. The fact is that the ideology has been largely determined by the type of collective society which has been established in the Soviet Union.

The authors of the October Revolution were Marxists, and were thus committed to abolishing the capitalist system and replacing it by a nationwide planned economy. For a brief period the experiment of allowing the workers to take charge was tried out, but, when this led to chaos, the party assumed control and has ever since retained it.

If a Communist regime is to be set up in a backward country, the first prerequisite, as Lenin saw, is industrialization; this is likely to be carried out as rapidly as possible since the quicker the country is developed, and particularly its war potential, the stronger will be the position of its rulers. The execution of such a program of necessity demands the centralization of power in the hands of a small group of leaders, along with the adoption of such unpopular measures as the fixing of wages, the direction of labor and the prohibition of strikes. And as large-scale planning geared to an expanding economy is impracticable if the plan is liable to be upset at any moment by a vote in a popular assembly, it is not to be expected that the planners will long tolerate any opposition. Furthermore, they will be tempted to interfere in one branch of human activity after another, seeing that all can be so manipulated as to assist the execution of their grand design.

All this has happened in the Soviet Union, and the outcome has been an ideology which derives from the logic of collectivism. Its basic principles are to be found in Marx's revolutionary doctrine, the implications of which were spelled out by Lenin and Stalin when confronted with the practical problem of setting up the type of social order Marx had advocated. Communist literature and propaganda have made us familiar with the doctrine, and there is no need to analyze it here even if space permitted. The issue to be decided is what role ideology plays today, and how far it influences Soviet policy.

Myths and the Masses

Virtually all analysts would agree that in the years of struggle before the October Revolution the Bolsheviks took the theory which lay behind their movement in deadly earnest; there is also general agreement that in the 1920's the doctrine acted as a stimulus to the workers, who took pride in building up their country. In the 1930's, however, the situation changed. Stalin assumed absolute power. The machinery of the state and of the secret police was greatly strengthened, and all prospect of establishing a genuine classless society disappeared. With the Stalin-Hitler Pact, if not before, the Soviet Union entered an era which can plausibly be represented as one of naked power politics, perpetuated after World War II in the aggressive and obstructive policies pursued by the regime. Hence it is sometimes argued that Communist ideology has now ceased to possess any importance; that it is simply a top-dressing of sophistries designed to rationalize measures inspired solely by Soviet interests; and that apart from a few fanatics, such as may be found in any society, no one believes in the doctrine any longer, least of all the leaders themselves.

Yet such unqualified assertions are erroneous. Consider, first, the outlook of the ordinary Soviet citizen *vis-à-vis* the ideology. Day in, day out, he is subjected to intensive and skillfully devised propaganda through every known medium, designed to demonstrate that the ideology on which the Soviet Union is based makes it the best of all possible worlds, and that on this account it is encircled with jealous enemies bent on its destruction. The Soviet leadership has always considered it essential that every citizen possess as deep an understanding of Communist principles as his mind is capable of assimilating, and those holding positions of consequence are obliged recurrently to pass through carefully graded schools of political instruction.

It is significant that whenever the leaders feel themselves in a tight corner—as in the recent aftermath of destalinization and the intervention in Hungary—their invariable reaction is to intensify indoctrination in an attempt to refocus public attention on "first principles." As hard-headed men they would certainly not attach such importance to indoctrination if they did not know that it paid dividends—and experience has proved that the persistent repetition of

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a body of ideas which are never challenged is bound to influence the minds of their recipients. Of course, the present generation does not react to the formal ideology with the same fervor as did its forebears who made the revolution, and there are doubtless those who view official apologetics with a large degree of cynicism. But between total commitment and total disillusionment there are many intermediate positions; it is quite possible for a man to regard much of what he is told as nonsense while still believing that there is something of value behind it, especially if he identifies that "something" with the greatness of his country as "the first socialist state" and believes in its historic mission.

Leadership Credence—a Hope or a Habit?

More significant, in the present context, than the attitude of the ordinary citizen is that of the ruling elite which is responsible for policy. What its top-ranking members believe is a question which no one, of course, can answer positively. But before surmising, as do some analysts, that the Soviet leadership cannot possibly believe in the myths it propounds, we should remind ourselves that no class or party ever finds it difficult to persuade itself of the soundness of the principles on which it bases its claim to rule.

The Soviet leaders are fortified in this conviction by the very nature of their creed. They have been nurtured in it from birth, and it would be strange indeed if they had remained unaffected. It has become second nature to these men to regard history as a dialectical process—one of incessant conflict between progressive and reactionary forces which can only be resolved by the victory of the former. The division of the world into antagonistic camps, which is an article of faith, is simply the projection onto the international stage of the struggle within capitalistic society between the bourgeoisie, which history has condemned, and the proletariat, whose ultimate triumph it has decreed. The leaders seem to be confident that history is on their side, that all roads lead to communism, and that the contradictions of capitalism must create the type of situation which they can turn to their advantage.

Democratic governments desirous of recommending a certain policy normally dwell upon its practical advantages. But in the Soviet Union this is not so. Any important change of line will be heralded by an article in *Pravda*, often of many columns, purporting to show that the new policy is ideologically correct because it accords with some recent decision of a party congress, or with Lenin's teaching, or with whatever other criterion may be adopted. How far the policy in question will have been inspired by considerations of ideology as opposed to others of a more mundane nature can never be precisely determined. This, however, is not an exclusive feature of the Communist system; in politics, as for that matter in personal relations, it is seldom possible to disentangle all the motives which determine conduct. The policies of any party or government are likely to reflect its political principles even if they are so framed as to strengthen its position, and there is no reason why the policies adopted by the Soviet leaders should constitute an exception.

Analysts of the "power politics" school of thought hold that the Kremlin leaders are concerned solely with Soviet national interest, and merely use the Communist movement to promote it. Yet here again the difficulty is to disengage factors which are closely associated. The future of the Communist movement cannot be disassociated from the fortunes of the Soviet Union. If the Soviet regime were to collapse, that movement would count for little, and whether it would long survive even in China is doubtful. Recognizing this, non-Russian Communist parties generally have remained subservient to Moscow even when threatened with large-scale defections of rank-and-file members in the face of particularly odious shifts in the Moscow line.

The "Separate Paths" Issue

The quarrel between the Soviet and the Yugoslav Communist parties—which an intergovernmental agreement of June 1956 has failed to resolve—is a good example of the interpenetration of ideological and non-ideological factors in policy determinations. The immediate occasion of the quarrel was Tito's unwillingness to allow the spread of Soviet influence through the presence of Soviet military officers and technological experts on Yugoslav soil. As a result Stalin determined to crush Tito, and resorted to various political and economic measures in an unsuccessful attempt to do so. It was at least a year before the struggle was extended to the ideological plane. But that it should have been was inevitable. One may well sympathize with Tito's desire for independence and hope that other national leaders will follow his example. Yet from the Communist point of view, if the movement is to be an international one, it must have an international center, and upon historical grounds alone Moscow has a strong claim to the mantle. Ever since Communist

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parties were formed, it was in fact to Moscow that their internal disputes were referred for settlement, just as it was Moscow which directed their general policy. Whether this role was performed well or ill is beside the point.

Hence the principle of "separate paths to socialism," approved by the Twentieth CPSU Congress for tactical reasons, is one which Moscow can accept only with reservations. If it merely means that in establishing communism in a given country consideration must be given to local conditions, and that every country's experience adds to the common store, then it is not only unobjectionable but is a salutary corrective to the earlier dogmatism which insisted on the universal applicability of the Russian experience. Such is the attitude nowadays expressed by Soviet theoreticians, though they insistently stress the dangers of exaggerating the importance of national characteristics, denying "the common laws of socialist development", or playing down the October Revolution. The official Soviet position is best expressed in an article in *New Times*, March 1956, which states that "while *serving as an example* to other working class parties, the CPSU *draws upon their experience and formulates it in general theoretical principles* for the benefit of all working class parties."

Clearly the Soviet leaders are on the defensive in this matter. They recognize that concessions must be made, but will make no more than they can help. The desire to perpetuate their own power doubtless influences their stand, but considering the fact that communism professes to be a world movement, it would be unreasonable to conclude that either national or personal interests are the sole factors motivating them.

Inefficiency—an Index of Ideology

Indeed, if the analysis given earlier in this article of the genesis of the Communist ideology is correct, the attitude of the Soviet leaders *must* be attributed, at least in part, to the theoretical principles which distinguish Communist regimes from other forms of dictatorship. Certainly the leaders shape and phrase their domestic and foreign policies to fit the general framework established by these principles, and the latter often do not allow much room for maneuver. In fact, their application may sometimes weaken rather than strengthen the country.

To take a simple example, much waste would be avoided if small traders were permitted to operate on a profit basis; the fishmonger, for instance, would have an incentive to put his fish on ice, which he frequently fails to do to the discomfort of the public. Allowance of profits, however, would constitute a return to private enterprise, which cannot be tolerated.

Similarly, in the Communist view it has long been regarded as indefensible to subordinate a higher to a lower form of socialized enterprise. Thus, while it has been apparent for years that Soviet agriculture would be more efficient if the Machine Tractor Stations were handed over to the collective farms, the issue has been consistently dodged, because the MTS are fully state-owned organs and therefore "higher" than the farms, which still belong in part to the peasants. When the economist Venzher advocated this measure some years ago, he was slapped down at once by Stalin, the fact that it had already been adopted in Yugoslavia only making his suggestion the more objectionable. Just two years ago Khrushchev launched an extensive program to strengthen the organization and power of the MTS. Very recently, however, he indicated that the regime was—at long last—prepared to yield to practical necessity on this point; in a speech on farm policy, he advocated the transfer of farm machinery to the collectives, and although his proposals are not yet legalized, it would appear that a number of MTS have already been dissolved.

The principle of hierarchy has not been repudiated, however, and still governs other aspects of agricul-

Arms and Ideology

As in the past, the party devotes keen attention to the ideological tempering of the officer cadres, to imbuing them with lofty party qualities and organizational ability. All conditions have been provided in the Army and Navy for successful political and military theory study by the officers. They have at their service evening universities of Marxism-Leninism, party schools, and an extensive network of libraries. After the October 1957 plenary session of the Party Central Committee, the Defense Minister and the Head of the Chief Political Administration issued a directive assigning fifty study hours for Marxist-Leninist instruction of military cadres; this is regarded as an integral part of officers' training.

—From Col. N. Mikhailenko, "The Party — Teacher of the Soviet Army and Navy," Krasnaia Zvezda, January 4, 1958.

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tural organization—for example, the relative status of the two forms of agricultural enterprise. From the standpoint of productive efficiency the collective farms are bad, but the state farms are worse. Nonetheless, the latter represent a "higher type" of organization, and thus the present virgin lands campaign has been based upon them.

Dogmatism in Foreign Policy

The same point can be scored by examining the Soviet Union's treatment of its satellites. Poland affords a good example. With the country at its mercy after World War II, the Soviet regime decided, among other measures, to integrate the Polish economy with its own. Now had Poland been regarded merely as a colony to be exploited, the operation would have been viewed primarily as a business proposition, and due attention would have been paid to such questions as the nature of the country's resources and the aptitudes of its people. The need to proceed with caution was very evident. The traditional hostility of the Poles to everything Russian should have been taken into account, as well as the fact that the Polish Communist Party had no public support (due in part to the liquidation of its established leaders during the Great Purges). Yet it was decided that the country must pass through, in shorter time intervals, precisely those stages of development which the Soviet Union had traversed. The result was a serious disruption of the economy through the erection of a top-heavy industrial structure on the basis of a depressed agriculture. This policy cannot be attributed to Stalin alone as it was continued after his death. It proved disastrous, and is only intelligible on the assumption that it was primarily motivated by ideological considerations.

The argument can be carried further. By its behavior throughout its history, the Soviet Union has incurred the hostility, or at least the suspicion, of the entire free world. Yet there was no practical reason why it should have done so. After the October Revolution the Bolshevik regime was faced with appalling domestic problems, and it had nothing to gain by courting the animosity of the West. The Soviet leaders might well have built up their country in accordance with the principles to which they were committed without exciting such widespread hostility. What governments do at home is commonly regarded as their own affair. Fundamentally, the regime in Yugoslavia is as Communist as that of the Soviet Union, and was established with an equal ruthlessness. But Tito, having asserted his independence from Moscow, has muffled his attacks on the West, and in turn the Western governments have demonstrated their desire—albeit tempered with caution—to believe in his good faith.

What no country will tolerate is the attempt, deliberately engineered by a foreign power, to overthrow its form of government; this has been the persistent aim and effort of the Soviet regime in defiance of its express diplomatic guarantees of non-interference. It is hard to see how this strategy has assisted the development of Soviet Russia, and that it has never been abandoned cannot be dissociated from those messianic and catastrophic elements in the Communist creed which influence, perhaps impel, the Soviet drive for world power.

IN CONCLUSION, it is frequently stated that communism has created an ideological cleavage between the West and the Soviet bloc. Yet this statement would be meaningless if the issue today were, as some believe, simply one of power politics. An ideology is significant only if it makes those who profess it act in a way they would not otherwise do. The fact that large numbers of persons accept communism would not constitute a danger if it did not lead them to support policies which threaten the existence of those who do not accept it. It is true that many people, especially in backward countries, call themselves Communists without having any clear idea of what it means. Yet the movement would not be the force it has become were there not in every country men and women who sincerely believe in the ideas behind it, which form collectively what we call its ideology.

To represent this ideology as a species of opium with which the Soviet leaders contrive to lull the people while taking care never to indulge in it themselves is to attribute to them an ability to dissociate

> *If certain people regard as a violation of the "Geneva spirit" our conviction that victory will be on the side of socialism, of the Marxist-Leninist teaching, these people obviously do not understand the "Geneva spirit" correctly. They should remember that we have never renounced and will never renounce our ideas, the struggle for the victory of communism. They will have to wait forever for us to disarm ideologically!*
>
> —From a speech by N. S. Khrushchev, published in Pravda, December 30, 1955.

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themselves from the logic of their system—an ability which it is unlikely they possess. For the concepts which make up that system, fantastic as many of them appear to be, will be found on examination to be interrelated, and to be logical extensions of the basic principles to which all Communists subscribe.

To turn it the other way around, Communists claim a theoretical justification for the basic principles in which they believe. But these principles must be translated into appropriate action; and action, if directed by the rulers of a powerful country like the Soviet Union, will take the form of *Realpolitik*. There is no yardstick which permits a measure of the exact relationship between power politics and ideology in the policies which result; but surely neither factor can be ignored.

National Interest: Key to Soviet Politics

By Samuel L. Sharp

AN ENORMOUS BODY of Western research and analysis focuses on Marxist-Leninist ideology as a clue to understanding Kremlin policy. This extensive and intensive preoccupation with matters doctrinal is, at least in part, the result of a rather widely circulated belief that the democratic world was guilty of neglect when it refused to take seriously the "theoretical" writings and pronouncements of Adolf Hitler. It has been alleged that these writings later guided Hitler's actions and that a ready key to his conduct was thus overlooked.

When, at the end of World War II, the Soviet Union appeared on the international scene as a power—and a menace—of the first order, led by a group consistently claiming its adherence to a body of doctrine as a guide to action, legions of experts began to dissect that body in a search for a key to Soviet behavior, current and future. The material at hand was certainly more promising than the intellectually scrawny homunculus of Nazi or Fascist "ideology". After all, Marxism has its not entirely disreputable roots in legitimate western thought. Even in terms of sheer bulk there was more to operate on, what with Lenin's and Stalin's additions and modifications of the original scriptures and the voluminous exegetic output of a generation of Soviet propagandists.

Mr. Sharp is Professor of International Relations at the American University, Washington, D. C., and visiting professor, Graduate Faculty, New School for Social Research, New York City.

The massive study of Communist ideology has had one happy result in that some serious scholarly output has been provided to counterbalance party-line apologias, thereby destroying a number of primitive notions concerning the Soviet system and what makes it tick. At the same time, in this writer's view, preoccupation with the search for a formula of interpretive and predictive value has produced its own distortions. These distortions seem to be the composite result of cold-war anxieties, faulty logic and disregard of some of the elementary principles and practices of international relations. To these causes must be added the human tendency to look beyond the simple and obvious for the complicated and mysterious in attempting to explain any condition which is exasperating and which is therefore perceived as strange and unique. Baffled by the Soviet phenomenon, millions in the Western world have found a negative consolation of sorts in the famous statement by Winston Churchill that Russian policy is "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." But how many have bothered to read the qualifying words which followed? Having disclaimed ability to forecast Soviet actions, Churchill added: "*But perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.*" [1]

Clearly implied in this observation was the logical supposition that the policy-makers of the Soviet

[1] Radio broadcast of October 1, 1939, reprinted in W. Churchill, *The Gathering Storm*, Houghton-Mifflin, Boston, 1948, p. 449. Author's italics.

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Union act in what they believe to be the best interest of the state over whose destinies they are presiding. In this sense the Soviet Union is to be looked upon as an actor, a protagonist, on the stage of international politics; and in this writer's view, its actions can be interpreted most fruitfully in terms of behavior *germane* to the practice of international politics. Without denying the possible pitfalls of this approach, the writer proposes to argue its usefulness as a key to understanding a phenomenon which the non-Communist world can ill afford to envelop in a fog of self-generated misinterpretation.

The Doubtful Art of Quotation

Whenever the suggestion is made that the concept of national interest be applied as an explanation of Soviet behavior on the international scene, objections are raised in many quarters. The most vigorous protests come, of course, from Soviet sources. It is a standard claim of Soviet spokesmen that their state is by definition something "different" (or "higher") and that the foreign policy of this entity is different in principle (*printsipialno otlichna*) from that of other states because the latter are capitalist and the former is socialist.[2] It would seem that only uncritical adherents of communism could take such statements seriously. Yet non-Communists very often cite them as a convenient *ipse dixit* in support of their own claim that the Soviet Union is indeed "different", though not in the way Soviet propaganda wants one to believe. The claim is that the Soviet Union is, at best, "a conspiracy disguised as a state" and cannot be viewed as a "normal" member of the world community of nations. There is no attempt to explain on what basis some Soviet statements are to be taken as reliable indices of regime motivations, while other statements, no less abundantly scattered throughout the Marxist-Leninist scriptures, are rejected as lie and deception.

It is surely dubious scholarship to collect quotations (sometimes reduced to half a sentence) from Lenin and Stalin without regard to the time, place, circumstances, composition of the audience and, whenever ascertainable, immediate purposes of such utterances. What results from such compilations, no matter how laboriously and ingeniously put together, is, as a thoughtful critic has pointed out, "a collection of such loose generalizations and so many exceptions and contradictions that few readers can find much guidance in it." [3] Stalin, for example, can be quoted as once having said that "with a diplomat words must diverge from facts" and that "a sincere diplomat would equal dry water, wooden iron"; yet this not too astute observation was made in 1913 in an article dealing with bourgeois diplomacy written by an obscure Georgian revolutionary who probably had never met a diplomat. His view in this instance is identifiable as a variant of the classic image of the diplomat as "an honorable gentleman sent abroad to lie for his country". This image may very well have stayed with the congenitally suspicious and pessimistic Stalin in later life, and thus might indeed afford us a clue to his "real" nature. However, sound scholarship would seek to reconstruct the attitudes of the Kremlin ruler out of words and deeds of a more relevant period of his life rather than from this loose piece of Djugashvili prose torn out of context.

The Vital Factor of Feasibility

Some objections to the interpretation of Soviet policies in terms of national interest are rooted in the aforementioned line of analysis which conjures up the ghost of Adolf Hitler. The democracies erred, did they not, in initially looking upon Hitler's aims as an expression of "legitimate" (we will return to this phrase in a moment) however distasteful national aspirations, only to discover later that they were dealing with a maniac whose appetites were unlimited. Since it is generally agreed that Soviet policy, like Hitler's, belongs to the totalitarian species, would it not be impardonable to repeat the same mistake by looking upon the aims of the Soviet leaders as the expression of the aspirations of a "normal" nation-state?

Two points should be made here. First, Hitler bears comparison with no one; there is no other leader in history who has combined his precise mental make-up with his enormous concentration of power. He

[2] To quote just one recent source, cf. V. I. Lissovskii, *Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo* (International Law), Kiev, 1955, p. 397.

[3] Marshall Knappen, *An Introduction to American Foreign Policy*, Harper & Bros., New York, 1956. The quote is from the chapter entitled "Capabilities, appeal and intentions of the Soviet Union" and refers specifically to the well-known effort by Nathan Leites in *A Study of Bolshevism* (Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1953) to construct, out of thousands of quotes from Lenin and Stalin bolstered with excerpts from nineteenth-century Russian literature, an "image of Bolshevism" and an "operational code" of the Politburo. See also the remarks on "Difficulties of content analysis" and "The problem of context" in John S. Reshetar, Jr., *Problems of Analyzing and Predicting Soviet Behavior* (Doubleday & Co., New York, 1955). In all fairness to Leites and his prodigious undertaking it must be pointed out that he was aware of a "spurious air of certainty" in his formulations, which were intended to be only "guesses about the mind of the Soviet Politburo" (*op. cit.*, p. 27).

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was, as his biographer Allan Bullock pointed out, a man "without aims", *i. e.*, without *limited* and therefore tractable aims.[4] At one point in his career Hitler began to disregard the cardinal rule of politics—the necessity of aligning ambitions with capacity to translate them into reality. He broke the barrier of the *feasible*, motivated by what could most likely be diagnosed as the death-wish. Whatever else may be said about the Soviet leaders, no one, including people who suspect them of ideological self-deception, has denied them the quality of caution. Far from seeking self-destruction, they are lustily bent on survival. This in itself, even in the complete absence of scruples, makes their aims *limited*.

Mr. Carew Hunt argues elsewhere in these pages that there are "messianic and catastrophic elements in the Communist creed which influence . . . the Soviet drive for world power." While there may indeed be a degree of messianism in the Soviet leadership's view of its mission, the "catastrophic" tendency seems to be held carefully in check. Hitler was propelled by the absurd notion that he had to accomplish certain aims before he reached the age of sixty—an arrogant and, from the point of view of German national interest, totally irrelevant assumption. Granted that the Soviet leaders aim at "world power" (a concept which in itself should be defined more explicitly than it is usually is), they have long since decided not to fix any specific time-limit for the achievement of this ultimate aim. Certainly the present generation of leaders has acted to modify (perhaps "refine" is a better word) the aggressive drive for power abroad at least to an extent which will allow some enjoyment at home of the tangible fruits of the revolution this side of the Communist heaven. Even back in the early days of Bolshevik rule, Lenin, though at times carried away by expectations of spreading revolution, never sacrificed practical caution to missionary zeal; repeatedly he warned his followers to look after the "bouncing baby" (the Soviet state), since Europe was only "pregnant with revolution" (which it wasn't).

An Applicable Concept of Interest

The second point to be made is a crucial one. Reluctance to analyze Soviet aims in terms of national interest is due, in part, to the aura of legitimacy which surrounds the "normal" run of claims of nation-states, giving rise to the notion that the term itself infers something legitimate. However, suggesting that Kremlin moves can best be understood in terms of what the leaders consider advantageous to the Soviet state by no means implies subscribing to their aims or sympathizing with them. In international relations the maxim *tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner* does not apply. The concept of national interest, by focussing attention on the *objective sources of conflict*—*i.e.*, those which *can* be explained rationally as issues between nations—permits us to view the international scene in terms of a global problem of power relations rather than a cops-and-robbers melodrama. We can then perceive which are the *tractable* elements in the total equation of conflict, and devote our energies to reducing or altering these factors.

This approach seems to the writer to be indispensable both to the scholar and to the statesman. The scholar who accepts the "natural" (in terms of the nature of international politics) explanation for Kremlin behavior is not likely to violate the "law of parsimony" by unnecessarily piling up hypotheses which are unprovable and which in any case simply confuse the issue, insofar as dealing practically with the Soviet Union is concerned. The statesman finds that he is coping with a phenomenon which he knows how to approach both in accommodation and in opposition, rather than with some occult and other-worldly force.

Those who object to the framework of analysis here proposed would say, as does Mr. Hunt, that there are many cases on record when the Soviet leaders have acted in a way clearly inconsistent with the Russian national interest and intelligible only in terms of ideological dogmatism. The answer to this argument is simple: it does not matter what Mr. Hunt—or anybody else—considers to be the Russian national interest; as the term is defined here, the only view which matters is that held by the Soviet leaders. By the same token it is a rather fruitless thing to speak of "legitimate" *vs.* "illegitimate" Soviet interests. One of the essential attributes of sovereignty (and the Soviet leaders are certainly jealous where their own is involved!) is that it is up to the sovereign to determine what serves him best.

Yet doesn't this reasoning render pointless the entire conceptual approach proposed? If Soviet national interest is what the Soviet leaders take it to be, and if one agrees—as one must—that their view of the world is derived largely from their adherence to Marxism-Leninism, isn't this another way of saying that Soviet behavior is the result of ideological conditioning? Not quite. The point at issue is whether the "pure" Soviet view of the world is important

[4] Allan Bullock, *Hitler—A Study in Tyranny*, Harper & Bros., New York, 1953.

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as a guide to action, whether the *ultimate* aims of the Communist creed are operative in policy determinations. In the present writer's view they are not; the fault of the opposing line of analysis is that in dwelling on the supposed impact of ideology on the leadership, it tends to ignore the degree to which the pursuit of ultimate goals has been circumscribed in time and scope by considerations of *the feasible*. In simple arithmetic, doctrine minus those aspects which are not empirically operative equals empirically determined policy. If a policy action is called "revolutionary expediency," it is still expediency. Why then introduce into the equation an element which does not affect the result?

A supporting view in this respect is W. W. Rostow's characterization of Soviet foreign policy as a series of responses to the outside world which, especially before 1939, "took the form of such actions as were judged most likely, *on a short-range basis*, to maintain or expand the national power of the Soviet regime." Despite the Soviet Union's vastly greater ability to influence the world environment in the postwar era, says Rostow, "there is no evidence that the foreign policy criteria of the regime have changed." [5] If some instances of Soviet behavior appear to have produced results actually detrimental to the Soviet interest, we must not only refrain from applying our view of Soviet interest but also—as Rostow's viewpoint suggests—judge the policy decisions involved in terms of their validity at the time they were made and not in the light of what happened later (remembering, too, that mistakes and miscalculations are common to all policy-makers, not just those who wear "ideological blinders").

The words "on a short-range basis" have been underscored above to stress that the term policy, if properly applied, excludes aims, ambitions or dreams not accompanied by action visibly and within a reasonable time capable of producing the results aimed at or dreamed of. In the case of the Soviet leaders, concentration on short-range objectives and adjustment to political realities has, in the brilliant phrase suggested by Barrington Moore, Jr., *caused the means to eat up the ends*.[6]

The objection will still be raised that the Soviet leaders mouth every policy decision in terms of ideological aims. Enough should have been said on this score to obviate a discussion here; as able students of the problem have pointed out, the Soviet leaders' claim to rule rests on their perpetuation of the ideology and their insistence on orthodoxy; they have no choice but to continue paying lip-service to the doctrine, even if it is no longer operative. The liberal mind somehow balks at this image of total manipulation, of an exoteric doctrine for public consumption which has no connection with its esoteric counterpart—that is, the principles or considerations which really govern Kremlin behavior. Yet allowance must be made for this possibility.

Moscow and International Communism

One serious argument of those who reject the image of the Soviet Union as a "legitimate" participant in the balance-of-power game played in the arena of international politics is that the Soviet leaders consistently violate the rules of the game by enlisting out-of-bounds help from foreign Communist parties. This point invites the following brief observations:

1) Early in its history the Communist International was transformed into a tool of Soviet foreign policy, at a time when few other tools were available to Moscow.

2) As soon as the Soviet state felt at all sure of its survival (after the period of civil war, foreign intervention and economic chaos), it reactivated the apparatus of foreign policy along more traditional lines.

3) Under Stalin, the Third International was reduced to a minor auxiliary operation. An index of his attitude toward it is the fact that he never once addressed a Comintern congress. Probably the International was kept up in the interwar period because it seemed to produce marginal dividends in terms of nuisance value. Moreover, Stalin could hardly have divorced himself from it officially at a time when he was jockeying for total power inside Russia, since this would have helped to confirm his opponents' accusations that he was "betraying the revolution". But he certainly did everything to show his belief in the ineffectiveness of the organization and its foreign components as against the growing power of the Soviet state.

4) When the entire record of Soviet success and failure is summed up, the achievements are clearly attributable to Soviet power and diplomacy with no credit due to the international Communist movement. Furthermore, the ties between the Soviet Union and foreign parties have never deterred Moscow from useful alliances or cooperation with other governments—including, from one time to another, the astutely

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[5] W. W. Rostow *et al.*, *The Dynamics of Soviet Society*, W. W. Norton & Co., New York, 1952, p. 136. Author's italics.

[6] Barrington Moore, Jr., *Soviet Politics: The Dilemma of Power*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1950.

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anti-Communist Turkish government of Ataturk; the more brutally anti-Communist regime of Adolf Hitler; and, during World War II, the western powers. That the Soviet leaders, by virtue of their doctrine, entertained mental reservations about the durability of friendly relations with these governments can hardly be doubted. But it is equally clear that the cessation of cooperation was due in each case to the workings of power politics rather than Soviet ideological dictate—that is, to the historical tendency of alliances to disintegrate when what binds them (usually a common enemy) disappears.

5) Finally, it might be argued that the Soviet appeal to foreign Communist parties is not dissimilar to the practice of various governments of different periods and persuasions to appeal for support abroad on the basis of some sort of affinity—be it Hispanidad, Slav solidarity, Deutschtum, or Pan-Arabism. The Soviet appeal is admittedly broader and the "organizational weapon" seems formidable, but their importance should not be exaggerated. Actually, there is no way at all to measure the effectiveness of the appeal *per se* since Communist "success" or "failure" in any situation always involves a host of other variables—in-

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Political Cynicism and Ideological Semantics: 1939

The war between Germany and the Anglo-French bloc is only in its first stage and has not yet been really developed. It is nevertheless clear that a war like this was bound to cause radical changes in the situation in Europe, and not only in Europe. In connection with these important changes in the international situation, certain old formulas, which we employed but recently and to which many people are so accustomed, are now obviously out of date and inapplicable. We must be quite clear on this point so as to avoid making gross errors in judging the new political situation that has developed in Europe.

We know, for example, that in the past few months such concepts as "aggression" and "aggressor" have acquired a new concrete connotation, a new meaning. It is not hard to understand that we can no longer employ these concepts in the sense we did, say, three or four months ago.

Today, as far as the European great powers are concerned, Germany is in the position of a state that is striving for the earliest termination of the war and for peace, while Britain and France, which but yesterday were declaiming against aggression, are in favor of continuing the war and are opposed to the conclusion of peace. The roles, as you see, are changing.

. . . .The ruling circles of Britain and France have lately been attempting to depict themselves as champions of the democratic rights of nations against Hitlerism, and the British Government has announced that its aim in the war with Germany is nothing more nor less than "the destruction of Hitlerism." It amounts to this, that the British, and with them the French supporters of the war, have declared something in the nature of an "ideological" war on Germany, reminiscent of the religious wars of olden times.

In fact, religious wars against heretics and religious dissenters were once the fashion. As we know, they led to the direst results for the masses, to economic ruin and the cultural deterioration of nations.

These wars could have no other outcome. But they were wars of the Middle Ages. Is it back to the Middle Ages, to the days of religious wars, superstition and cultural deterioration that the ruling classes of Britain and France want to drag us?

In any case, under an "ideological" flag a war has now been started of even greater dimensions and fraught with even greater danger for the peoples of Europe and the whole world. But there is absolutely no justification for a war of this kind. One may accept or reject the ideology of Hitlerism as well as any other ideological system; that is a matter of political views. But everybody would understand that an ideology cannot be destroyed by force, that it cannot be eliminated by war. It is, therefore, not only senseless but criminal to wage such a war as the war for the "destruction of Hitlerism," camouflaged as a fight for "democracy."

—*From an address to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR by V. M. Molotov, then Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, October 31, 1939. As translated in Ann Su Cardwell,* Poland and Russia: The Last Quarter Century (*Sheed & Ward, New York, 1944*).

* * *

Hitlerism is a matter of taste. But to undertake war for the "annihilation of Hitlerism" is criminal folly . . . . (*Izvestia*, October 9, 1939.)

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cluding military, geographical, social, political or economic factors. In the last analysis, virtually every instance where Moscow has claimed a victory for communism has depended on Soviet manipulation of traditional levers of national influence.

An Exception to Prove the Rule

There remains one area of Soviet "foreign policy" where the Soviet leaders have supplemented power politics—or more accurately in this instance naked force—with an attempt to derive special advantage, a sort of "surplus value," from claiming ideological obeisance to the Soviet Union as the seat of the secular church of communism. This area is the so-called Soviet orbit in Eastern Europe.

The term foreign policy is enclosed in quotation marks here because Stalin obviously did not consider areas under the physical control of Soviet power as nations or governments to be dealt with in their own right. He was clearly impatient with the claim of at least some Communist parties that their advent to power had changed the nature of their relationship to Moscow, and that the party-to-party level of relations must be separated from the government-to-government level (as Gomulka argued in 1948). In Stalin's thinking, especially after 1947, the East European regimes were not eligible for more real sovereignty than the "sovereign" republics of the Soviet Union. He attempted to extend the principle of *democratic centralism* (a euphemism for Kremlin control) to these countries, allowing them only as much of a facade of sovereignty as was useful for show toward the outside world.

One need not necessarily dig into doctrine to explain this attitude; in fact, doctrine until recently said nothing at all about relations between sovereign Communist states. The explanation lies to a large extent in Stalin's personal predilection for total control, plus the need to tighten Moscow's bonds to the limit, by whatever means or arguments possible, in the face of the bipolarization of global power after World War II.

Stalin's successors began by pressing the same claims of ideological obeisance from the satellites. But rather strikingly—in the same period that their foreign policy has scored substantial successes in other areas in traditional terms of diplomatic advances and manipulation of the economic weapon [7]—they have failed in the one area where they attempted to substitute the ties of ideology for the give-and-take of politics. Communist parties in power, it turned out (first in the case of Yugoslavia, while Stalin still reigned, and later in Poland, not to mention the very special case of China), claimed the right to be sovereign—or at least semi-sovereign—actors on the international scene. Whether or not this makes sense ideologically to the Soviet leaders is unimportant; they have recognized the claim.

It is not necessary to review here the post-Stalin history of fluctuating Soviet relations with Eastern Europe which began with the B. & K. pilgrimage to Belgrade. Let us take only the most recent attempt to reformulate the nature of relations between the USSR and other Communist countries—the interparty declaration issued on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution. On the surface, the declaration, published in the name of twelve ruling Communist parties, seems to reimpose a pattern of ideological uniformity as well as to recognize the special leadership position of the Soviet Union.[8] However, the circumstances of the gathering and the internal evidence of the declaration, together with the reports of some of the participants, show a far more complex situation.

The following aspects of the conference deserve attention: First, the very fact that the parties representing governments of sovereign countries were singled out for a special meeting and declaration instead of being lumped together with the mass of parties (many of them illegal, some leading no more than a paper existence) is a significant departure from past practice. Secondly, the Yugoslav party, though represented at the festivities, refused to sign the declaration, apparently after long negotiations. Thirdly, attempts to revive in any form an international, Moscow-based organization resembling the Comintern were unsuccessful. Gomulka's report on the meeting made it clear that the Polish party opposed both a new Comintern (for which it nevertheless had a few good words) and a new Cominform (for which it had nothing but scorn).[9]

A point of particular significance was the revelation that future international gatherings of Communist parties, especially those in power, are to be based on previous agreements concerning the agenda. According to Gomulka, problems which each party thinks it

[7] Samuel L. Sharp, "The Soviet Position in the Middle East," *Social Science*, National Academy of Economics and Political Sciences, Vol. 32, No. 4, October, 1957.

[8] The text of the declaration, adopted at a meeting held on November 14–16, 1957, was published in *Pravda* on November 22. A separate "peace manifesto" issued in the name of all of the Communist parties present at the congregation appeared in *Pravda* a day later.

[9] Gomulka's report was published in *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, November 29, 1957.

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can best solve "*for itself and its country*" will not be decided by interpatry conferences.[10]

Perhaps most significant for the purposes of the present discussion was a statement by Mao Tse-tung, who next to Khrushchev and Suslov was the main speaker at the meeting of the "ruling" parties and was billed as co-sponsor of the declaration. Mao bolstered his argument for the recognition of the leading position of the Soviet Union in the "socialist camp" with the remark that "China has not even one-fourth of a sputnik while the Soviet Union has two." [11] Now, the possession of a sputnik is a symbol of achievement and a source of prestige for the Soviet Union, but certainly not in terms of ideology. It was Soviet national power to which Mao paid deference.

In sum, the entire circumstances of the gathering indicate a disposition on the part of the Soviet Union to substitute—wherever it has to—the give-and-take of politics for its former relationship with the orbit countries, which relied on naked power to enforce demands of ideological subservience.

* * *

From all the foregoing, it should be clear that the task of the non-Communist world is not to worry itself sick over the ultimate goals of the Soviet leadership or the degree of its sincerity, but to concentrate on multiplying situations in which the Soviet Union either will be forced or will choose to play the game of international politics in an essentially traditional setting. How the Kremlin leaders will square this with their Marxist conscience is not really our problem.

[10] Gomulka, *ibid.* See also an analysis of the conference entitled, "Gescheiterte Komintern-Renaissance" (Failure of Comintern Revival), *Ost-Probleme*, Bad Godesberg, Vol. X, No. 1, January 3, 1958.

[11] Cited in Friedrich Ebert's report to the East German party (SED), published in *Neues Deutschland*, East Berlin, November 30, 1957, p. 4.

The Logic of One-Party Rule

By Richard Lowenthal

TO WHAT EXTENT are the political decisions of the Soviet leadership influenced by its belief in an official ideology—and to what extent are they empirical responses to specific conflicts of interest, expressed in ideological terms merely for purposes of justification? The phrasing of the question at issue suggests the two extreme answers which are *prima facie* conceivable—on the one hand, that ideology provides the Kremlin with a ready-made book of rules to be looked up in any situation; on the other, that its response to reality takes place without any reference to ideology. Yet any clear formulation of this vital issue will show that both extremes are meaningless nonsense.

A ready-made book of rules for any and every situation—an unvarying road-map to the goal of communism which the Soviet leaders must predictably follow—cannot possibly exist, both because the situations to be met by them are not sufficiently predictable, and because no government which behaved in so calculable a manner could conceivably retain power. On the other hand, empirical "Realpolitik" without ideological preconceptions can exist as little as can "empirical science" without categories and hypotheses based on theoretical speculation. Confronted with the same constellation of interests and pressures, the liberal statesman will in many cases choose a different course of action from the conservative—and the totalitarian Communist's choice will often be different from that of either.

It seems surprising, therefore, that at this late stage of discussion Professor Sharp is apparently in earnest in defending the extreme of the "Realpolitik" interpretation and in denying completely the relevance of Communist ideology for the formation, and hence the understanding, of Soviet foreign policy. The

A frequent contributor to these pages, Mr. Lowenthal is a distinguished political analyst and writer on international affairs for the London Observer. *He is now working on a book to be called* Totalitarianism and Social Change.

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latter, he assures us, can be adequately understood in terms of national interest, just as with any other state. When reminded by Mr. Carew Hunt of certain irrational features of Soviet foreign policy, he replies that what matters is not any outsider's concept of Soviet interests, but the Soviet leaders' own. Yet this reduces his thesis to a tautology: he "proves" that national interest motivates Soviet foreign policy by the simple device of labeling whatever motivates it "national interest."

Surely Professor Sharp cannot have it both ways. Either there are objective criteria of national interest, recognizable by the scholar—and then the view that these interests explain Soviet actions is capable of proof or refutation; or else it is admitted that different statesmen may interpret national interest in different but equally "legitimate" ways—and then the concept of a self-contained study of international relations collapses, because a consideration of the internal structures of different national communities and of the "ideologies" reflecting them becomes indispensable for an understanding of their foreign policies.

The latter observation does not, of course, apply to Communist states alone, although it is only reasonable to expect the influence of the monopolistic ideology of a single-party state to be specially pervasive. Mr. George Kennan, in his 1950 lectures on American diplomacy, has convincingly shown the relevance of ideological factors to an understanding of modern United States foreign policy as well. To deny this influence *a priori* and to admit, as Professor Sharp apparently would, only the *Ding an sich* of national interest on one side, and the accidental element of human error or pathology (such as Hitler's "death-wish") on the other, seems to this writer to be an unjustifiable renunciation of one of the limited roads to understanding which are available to present-day political science.

The Function of Doctrine

Assuming, then, that the Soviet leaders' ideology is relevant to their conduct, the real problem remains to discover which are the actual operative elements in it, and in what way they affect policy decisions. Clearly it would be folly to expect that Soviet policy could be predicted solely from an exegetic study of the Marxist-Leninist canon. Not only is it impossible for any group of practical politicians to base their decisions on an unvarying book of rules; there is any amount of historical evidence to show that the rules have been altered again and again to fit the practical decisions *ex post facto*. Moreover, there are vast parts of the Communist ideological structure, such as the scholastic refinements of "dialectical materialism" or the labor theory of value, which in their nature are so remote from the practical matters to be decided that their interpretation cannot possibly affect policy decisions. They may be used in inner-party arguments to *justify* what has been decided on other grounds, but that is all.

How, then, are we to distinguish those elements of Soviet ideology which are truly operative politically from those which are merely traditional scholastic ballast, linked to the operative elements by the historical accident of the founding fathers' authorship? The answer is to be found by going back to the original Marxian meaning of the term "ideology"—conceived as a distorted reflection of social reality in the consciousness of men, used as an instrument of struggle. The fundamental, distinctive social reality in the Soviet Union is the rule of the bureaucracy of a single, centralized and disciplined party, which wields a monopoly of political, economic and spiritual power and permits no independent groupings of any kind. The writer proposes as an hypothesis that the operative parts of the ideology are those which are indispensable for maintaining and justifying this state of affairs: "Marxism-Leninism" matters inasmuch as it expresses, in an ideologically distorted form, the logic of one-party rule.[1]

Totalitarian Parallels

There are a few interconnected ideological features which are common to all the totalitarian regimes of

[1] While this comes close to the position outlined in Mr. Carew Hunt's paper, I cannot follow him in his assumption that the totalitarian party monopoly is a by-product of the attempt to establish collectivist economic planning or to achieve the speedy industrialization of a backward country. This neo-Marxist view, held by such otherwise divergent authors as Professor Hayek and Milovan Djilas, is contradicted by the fact that the Bolshevik party monopoly, including the ban on inner-party factions, was fully established by Lenin at the time of the transition to the "New Economic Policy" (1921), when economic planning was reduced to a minimum and forced industrialization not yet envisaged. Independent of the concrete economic program, totalitarianism was implicit in the centralized, undemocratic structure of a party consciously created as an instrument for the conquest of power, and in the ideological characteristics resulting (to be discussed further in this article). Of course, totalitarian power, once established, favors total economic planning and the undertaking of revolutionary economic tasks by the state; but this is a consequence, not a cause. Marx never developed a concept of total planning, and even Lenin never imagined anything of the kind before 1918. But Marx in his youth at least equated the "dictatorship of the proletariat" with the Jacobin model, and Lenin followed this model throughout.

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our century—whether of the nationalist-fascist or of the Communist variety. We may designate them as the elements of chiliasm, of collective paranoia, and of the representative fiction. Each totalitarian regime justifies its power and its crimes by the avowed conviction, first, that its final victory will bring about the Millennium—whether defined as the final triumph of communism or of the master race—and second, that this state of grace can only be achieved by an irreconcilable struggle against a single, omnipresent and multiform enemy—whether Monopoly Capitalism or World Jewry—whose forms include every particular opponent of the totalitarian power. Each also claims to represent the true will of the people—the *volonté générale*—independent of whether the people actually support it, and argues that any sacrifice may be demanded from the individual and the group for the good of the people and the defeat of its devilish enemies.

The Communist version of these basic beliefs is superior to the Nazi version in one vital respect. Because the appeal of racialism is in its nature restricted to a small minority of mankind, the Nazis' goal of world domination could not possibly have been attained without a series of wars, preferably surprise attacks launched against isolated opponents. Because the appeal of communism is directed to all mankind, it can be linked with the further doctrine of the inevitable victory of the rising forces of socialism over the imperialist enemy, which is disintegrating under the impact of its own internal contradictions. This central ideological difference, and not merely the psychological difference between Hitler and the Soviet leaders, explains why the latter are convinced that history is on their side and that they need not risk the survival of their own regime in any attempt to hasten its final triumph: they believe in violence, revolutionary and military, as one of the weapons of policy, but they do not believe in the inevitability of world war.

Awkward Aims and Claims

Yet the Communist version of totalitarian ideology also suffers from some weaknesses and contradictions from which the Nazi and Fascist versions are free. In the first place, its vision of the Millennium has more markedly utopian features—the classless society, the end of exploitation of man by man, the withering away of the state—which make awkward yardsticks for the real achievements of Communist states. Secondly, in a world where nationalism remains a force of tremendous strength, an internationalist doctrine is bound to come into conflict with the interests of any major Communist power, or with the desire of smaller Communist states for autonomy.

Thirdly, by rejecting the "Fuehrer principle" and claiming to be "democratic", Communist ideology makes the realities of party dictatorship and centralistic discipline more difficult to justify; yet because appeal to blind faith is not officially permitted, justification is needed in "rational" terms. It is precisely this continuous need for the pretense of rational argument—the awkward heritage of communism's origin from revolutionary Western democracy—which has led to the far greater elaboration of its ideology compared to that of "irrationalist" right-wing totalitarianism, and which gives its constant interpretation so much greater importance in preserving the cohesion of the party regime. Due to the

MARXISM-LENINISM. . .

The Pragmatic Approach

Some adherents of "pure theory" try to present the activities of our party and the measures it carries out as something in the nature of narrow expediency. Individual supporters of such views may also be found among writers. Such errors cannot be left unanswered. Let us see just how one should understand the relationship of theory and practice from the Marxist point of view. No Marxist-Leninist would ever think of belittling the importance of revolutionary theory. As Lenin said, there can be no revolutionary practice without revolutionary theory.

The theory of Marxism-Leninism is the expression of the fundamental interests of the working class, the fundamental interests of the working people. It is not a dogma, but a guide to practical revolutionary action. At every new stage of historical development life poses its tasks, which stem from the requirements of society. A creative approach to theory, the ability to develop and advance the science of Marxism-Leninism, consists in correctly understanding the new urgent tasks of social development on the basis of scientific generalization of the experience of life, and in outlining ways for practical accomplishment of these tasks.

—From N. S. Khrushchev, "For a Close Tie Between Literature and Art and the Life of the People," Pravda, August 28, 1957.

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fictions of democracy and rationality, the morale of party cadres has been made dependent on the appearance of ideological consistency.

The result of these inherent weaknesses of Communist ideology is that the component doctrines—dealing with the "dictatorship of the proletariat", the party's role as a "vanguard" embodying the "true" class consciousness, "democratic centralism", "proletarian internationalism" and the "leading role of the Soviet Union"—become focal points of ideological crises and targets of "revisionist" attacks whenever events reveal the underlying contradictions in a particularly striking way. Yet these are the very doctrines which the regime cannot renounce because they are the basic rationalizations of its own desire for self-preservation.

We can expect, then, that Communist ideology will have an effective influence on the policy decisions of Soviet leaders when, and only when, it expresses the needs of self-preservation of the party regime. We can further expect that ideological changes and disputes within the Communist "camp" will offer clues to the conflicts and crises—the "contradictions"—which are inseparable from the evolution of this, as of any other, type of society. The fruitful approach, in this writer's view, consists neither in ignoring Communist ideology as an irrelevant disguise, nor in accepting it at its face value and treating it as a subject for exegesis, but in using it as an indicator of those specific drives and problems which spring from the specific structure of Soviet society—in regarding it as an enciphered, continuous self-disclosure, whose cipher can be broken by sociological analysis.

Two Camps—One Enemy

Let us now apply this approach to the doctrine of the "two camps" in world affairs. The "two-camp" concept was not, of course, a Stalinist invention, although this is sometimes supposed. The postwar situation with its alignment of the Communist and Western powers in two openly hostile politico-military blocs merely gave plausibility to a world image which was inherent in Leninism from the beginning, but which attracted little attention in the period when the Communist "camp" was just an isolated fortress with several outposts. Nor has the doctrine disappeared with the post-Stalin recognition of the importance of the uncommitted, ex-colonial nations and of the tactical value of incorporating them in a "peace zone"; it remains one of the basic ideas of the Moscow twelve-party declaration of last November, and one of the fundamental subjects of ideological disagreement between the Soviets and the Yugoslav Communists.

The Yugoslavs can reject the "two camp" doctrine because they admit the possibility of "roads to socialism" other than Communist party dictatorship—"reformist" roads for advanced industrial countries with parliamentary traditions, "national revolutionary" roads for ex-colonial countries. It follows from this view that Communist states have no monopoly on progress, and that alliances have no ultimate ideological meaning.

The Soviets still assert that while there can be different roads to Communist power, and minor differences in the use of power once gained, there is no way of achieving socialism except by the "dictatorship of the proletariat exercised by its vanguard". It follows that tactical agreements with semi-socialist neutrals are not different in kind from the wartime alliance with the Western "imperialists", or the prewar pact with Hitler—maneuvers which are useful in dividing the forces of the "class enemy" but which remain subordinate to the fundamental division of the world into the Communists versus the Rest.

In other words, the "two camp" doctrine is the Communist version of what we have called the element of "collective paranoia" in totalitarian ideology—its need for a single, all-embracing enemy which is assumed to pull the wires of every resistance to the party's power. The term "paranoia" is used here not to infer that the phenomenon in question is due to psychotic processes in either the leaders or the mass following of totalitarian parties, but merely to describe, through a convenient psychological analogy, the ideological mechanism of projection which ascribes the regime's drive for unlimited power to an imagined all-enemy. The essential point is that in the nature of totalitarianism, any independent force—either inside or outside the state—is regarded as ultimately hostile; the concept of "two camps" and that of "unlimited aims" are two sides of the same phenomenon.

Moscow's Double-Indemnity Tactics

Now Professor Sharp is, of course, entirely right in asking where this doctrine impinges on actual Soviet foreign policy—given the undoubted facts that actual Soviet aims, and the risks incurred in their pursuit, are limited at any given moment; that the Soviets are perfectly capable of concluding "temporary" alliances with "bourgeois", "imperialist" or even "fascist" states; and that most other alliances

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in this impermanent world are proving to be "temporary" as well, for quite non-ideological reasons. The present writer would suggest to him that the difference has manifested itself in the peculiar suspicion with which the Soviets treated their "imperialist" allies even at the height of the war, seeking in particular to isolate their own population from contact; in the manner in which they sought to create additional "guarantees" for the reliability of those allies by the use of local Communist parties wherever this was possible; and above all, in the difference between the traditional and the Communist concepts of "spheres of influence" as illuminated by the different interpretations of the Yalta agreements.

The peculiar forms taken by Moscow's suspicion of its wartime allies are too well known to need elaboration here; but it is less generally realized that such behavior was merely the reverse side of Soviet efforts to "strengthen" such temporary alliances where possible, by the use of party ties. Existence of the party channel has not, of course, been a *sine qua non* for Moscow's intragovernmental deals, as is shown by the examples of Russo-Turkish cooperation after World War I, the Stalin-Hitler pact, and perhaps also present Soviet cooperation with Egypt. But wherever Communist parties were tolerated by the partner, Soviet foreign policy has assigned to them a vital role. Indeed, the implication that Stalin never used the foreign Communists for any important purposes is perhaps the most astonishing aspect of Professor Sharp's article.

In the 1920's, Stalin's Chinese policy was openly run in double harness; diplomatic support for the Nationalist advance to the North was supplemented by an agreement of affiliation between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang, enabling the Communist to occupy influential political and military positions—an attempt no less serious for its ultimate total failure in 1927. In the 1930's, a variant of the same "dual policy" was evident when Moscow supported the League and "collective security", while Communist parties in France and Spain pursued "popular front" policies which soft-pedalled economic and social demands for the sake of influencing governmental foreign policy. In the Spanish case, the Communists, aided by the Republicans' dependence on Soviet supplies, ended up in virtual control of the Republic on the eve of its final collapse.

Again during World War II, Communists in the resistance movements and in the free Western countries were ordered to pursue the same tactics of social moderation and occupation of key positions as were practiced in China in the 1920's and Spain in the 1930's. Wartime military and political cooperation between "Soviet China" and Chiang Kai-shek was urged in the same spirit, with considerable success. All these are the foreign policy methods of a state *sui generis*—a one-party state enabled by its ideology to make use of a disciplined international movement organized for the struggle for power. To compare them—and the secondary opportunities for infiltration and espionage which they offer in addition to their main political objectives—to the use of vague cultural influences like "Hispanidad" is to show a notable degree of innocence.

Yalta—An Historic "Misunderstanding"

The crucial example to illustrate the role of ideology in Soviet foreign policy, however, remains the history of the postwar division of Europe. The writer is not concerned here with the political controversy over whether this division, as first laid down in the wartime agreements at Teheran and Yalta, was inevitable in the light of the military situation as seen at the time, or whether the Western statesmen committed an avoidable mistake of disastrous dimensions. What matters in the present context is the different meaning attached by the Western and Communist leaders, in concluding these agreements, to the concept of "spheres of influence," and the consequences of this "misunderstanding".

That Great Powers are in a position to exert a measure of influence over their smaller neighbors, and that they use this influence in one way or another to increase as far as possible their security against attack by other Great Powers, is an experience general in the politics of sovereign states and unlikely to be superseded by any amount of declamation about "equality of rights"; hence, the fact that the wartime allies, in drawing a military line of demarcation from North to South across the center of Europe, should have tried to agree about their postwar spheres of influence is, by itself, proof of realistic foresight rather than of morally reprehensible cynicism.

To Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, however, these spheres of influence meant what they had traditionally meant in the relations of sovereign states—a gradual shading over from the influence of one power or group of powers to that of the other, a shifting relationship which might be loosely described in terms of "percentages of influence", ranging from 50/50 to 90/10. To the Soviets, "spheres of influence" meant something completely different in the framework of their ideology—the ideology of the single-party state. To them there could be no securely "friendly" gov-

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ernment except a government run by a Communist party under their discipline; no sphere of influence but a sphere of Communist rule; no satisfactory percentage short of 100. Hence the consistent Soviet efforts, which began even before the end of the European war, to impose total control by Communist parties in every country on their side of the demarcation line—an effort that was finally successful everywhere but in Finland and Eastern Austria; hence also the indignant protests of the Western powers that the Soviets had broken the agreements on free elections and democratic development, and the equally indignant Soviet retort that they were only installing "friendly governments" as agreed, that theirs was the truly "democratic" system, and that they had kept scrupulously to the essential agreement on the military demarcation line.

A large section of Western opinion has concluded from this experience that agreements with the Soviets are useless in principle, because "you cannot trust them"; and Professor Sharp's insistence on national interest as the sole key to Soviet policy is probably at least in part a reaction against this emotional and moralizing approach. In fact, any interpretation of the postwar experience overlooking the fact that the Soviets have for reasons of national self-interest, kept to the "self-enforcing" agreement on the demarcation line, would be as seriously one-sided as one overlooking the fact that they have, for reasons of ideology or party interest, broken every agreement on "percentages" and free elections.

There is no need, however, to base future policy on either of two one-sided views equally refuted by experience. Nobody in the Western world has argued more powerfully against the "moralizing" approach to foreign policy, and for a return to the give-and-take of diplomacy based on real interests, than George Kennan; yet in his recent Reith lectures as before, he insists that the specific ideological distortion in the Soviet leaders' image of the world, far from being magically cured by a return to diplomacy, has to be taken into account continuously in judging which kind of agreements are possible and which are not. After all, the peoples of Eastern Europe are still paying for the illusion of the West that the Soviet Union was a state like any other, pursuing its power interests without regard to ideology.

The Soviet Dilemma in Eastern Europe

If we now turn to interstate and interparty relations within the Communist camp, we seem at first sight to have entered an area where ideology is adapted quite unceremoniously to the changing requirements of practical politics. Lenin, having barely seized power in Russia and looking forward to an early spreading of Communist revolution, could talk airily enough about the sovereign equality and fraternal solidarity of sovereign "socialist" states. Stalin, having determined after the failure of short-term revolutionary hope to concentrate on "socialism in a single country", came to regard international communism as a mere tool of Soviet power, and to believe that revolutionary victories without the backing of Soviet arms were neither possible nor desirable; he wanted no sovereign Communist allies, only satellites, and he got them in postwar Eastern Europe.

The independent victories of the Yugoslav Communists at the end of the war and of the Chinese Communists in 1949 nevertheless posed the problem he had sought to avoid, and thus required a revision of policy and ideology. But, so one argument goes, the stubborn old man had lost the flexibility to accept the situation; he precipitated a needless quarrel with the Yugoslavs and generally prevented the necessary adjustment while he lived. His heirs, however, hastened to correct his mistakes and to put inter-Communist relations back on a basis of sovereign equality and diplomatic give-and-take, not only with China and Yugoslavia but, after some trial and error, with all Communist states. Or did they?

In the above "common sense" account, not only the facts of the final phase are wrong; by deliberately neglecting the ideological aspect, it loses sight of all the real difficulties and contradictions which remain inherent in the situation. Because the Soviet Union is both a great power and a single-party state tied to an international ideology, it cannot be content either to oppress and exploit other Communist states or to come to terms with them on a basis of expediency; it must act in a way that will ensure the ideological unity of the Communist "camp" and its own authority at the center.

Stalin's insistence on making the "leading role of the Soviet Union" an article of the international creed expressed not just the idiosyncrasies of a power-mad tyrant, but his perception of one side of the dilemma—the risk that a recognition of the sovereign equality of other Communist states might loosen the solidarity of the "camp" in its dealings with the non-Communist world, and weaken the ideological authority of the Soviet party leaders, with ultimate repercussions on their position in the Soviet Union itself. His successors disavowed him because his Yugoslav policy had failed, and because they perceived the other side of the dilemma—that rigid

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insistence on Soviet hegemony might break up the unity of the "camp" even more quickly, and might in particular lead to open conflict with China. But by going to Peiping and Belgrade and admitting the "mistakes" of Stalin's "Great Russian chauvinism" (as well as the "mistakes" of his internal terrorist regime), they precipitated the very crisis of authority which he had feared.

The Reassertion of Soviet Primacy

Even Khrushchev and his associates, however, never intended to grant effective sovereign equality to the other Communist satellite regimes of Eastern Europe, which in contrast to Yugoslavia and China had come into being exclusively through the pressure of Soviet power; they merely had planned to make the satellite regimes more viable by reducing Soviet economic exploitation and administrative interference, while maintaining full policy control. In the one case in which not full sovereignty, but at least effective internal autonomy, was in fact granted—the case of Poland—the Soviet leaders were forced to act against their will as a result of open local defiance in a critical international situation. To say that the other East European participants in the Moscow twelve-party meeting of last November, or for that matter the participants from Outer Mongolia and North Korea, represented "governments of sovereign countries" is to mistake the fancies of Communist propaganda for political facts. Nor do the facts bear out Professor Sharp's interpretation that the outcome of the conference showed the Soviet leaders' willingness to rely in their future relations with these "sovereign governments" on the give-and-take of diplomacy. Rather, they confirm Mr. Carew Hunt's view that the need for a single center of international authority is inherent in the Soviet Communist Party's conception of its own role and in its ideology.

The real purpose of that conference was to exploit the recent successes of the Soviet Union as a military and economic power in order to restore the indispensable but lately damaged ideological authority of its leaders in the international Communist movement. The principle of "proletarian internationalism"—*i. e.*, unity in foreign policy—had been recognized by all participants, including for the first time in many years the Yugoslavs, before the conference started. Now Moscow was aiming at the further recognition both of its own leadership role and of the need for doctrinal unity, a joint struggle against "revisionism" on the basis of common principles, abolishing once and for all the heresy of "polycentrism" (*i.e.*, the concept of a plurality of truly autonomous Communist movements).

As it turned out, the Yugoslavs refused both propositions, while the Polish Communists and the nonruling but important Italian Communist Party accepted them only with mental reservations, insisting in practice on their right to decide for themselves how the "common principles" would be applied in their own countries. As opposed to this partial failure, however, Moscow was successful in winning full acceptance of the new dispensations by the Chinese Communists and the satellites, as well as in getting agreement on a new, elaborate international liaison machinery within the secretariat of the Soviet Communist Central Committee, in implementation of its renewed claim to international authority.

Moscow's partial failure, therefore, does not indicate that the Soviets will be content with less than they demanded, but that conflict continues. The Soviet press has already reactivated its campaign against Polish "revisionist" ideologies, insisting to Mr. Gomulka that revisionism is the chief internal danger in *all* Communist movements, including that of Poland. Moreover, the proposition defending a Communist party's autonomy in deciding its policy—conceded in principle at the time of Khrushchev's Belgrade visit and at the Twentieth CPSU Congress—is now singled out as a "revisionist" heresy; increasingly the example of Imre Nagy is invoked to show how a demand for autonomy led him down a "road" of "betrayal" and finally "counterrevolution". While the methods of Khrushchev remain conspicuously different from those of Stalin, the logic of the one-party regime, which requires insistence on Soviet authority as a precondition for unity both in foreign policy and in ideological principles, has forced the present first secretary to reassert some of the very doctrines he rashly threw overboard in 1955–56.

Ideology on the Home Front

Ultimately, the need to fight "revisionism" in Eastern Europe, even at the price of renewed difficulties with both Yugoslavia and Poland, arises from the need to strengthen the ideological defenses of the party regime in Russia itself. To admit that in Hungary the workers rose against a Communist government would call into question the basic identification of the ruling party with the working class—the fiction of the "dictatorship of the proletariat." To let Yugoslav propaganda for "workers' management" pass unchallenged would confirm the implication that Soviet factories, having no workers' councils with

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similar rights, are managed in the interest not of the workers but of the privileged bureaucracy. To keep silent when the Poles proudly report the improvement of their agricultural yields since the dissolution of most of their collective farms would encourage Soviet peasants to dream of similar reforms. To condone the increased, if still limited, freedom of artistic, literary and philosophical discussion now permitted in Poland and Yugoslavia would strengthen the demands of Soviet writers and scholars for similar freedom.

The obvious and intended implication here is that Soviet reconciliation with Yugoslavia and the near-revolutionary changes in Poland merely aggravated pressures for change which *already* existed in Russia itself. Thus the present account would be incomplete without some attempt to indicate, however sketchily, how ideological changes can be used as aids in interpreting the Soviet domestic scene as well as Kremlin foreign policy and bloc relations.

Earlier in the paper, reference was made to some of the basic tenets which seem inseparably bound up with the preservation and justification of a Communist one-party regime. But within this unchanging framework, considerable variations in detail have taken place in the history of the Soviet Union. The appearance or disappearance of one of these "ideological variables" may be a valuable indicator of the kind of pressures which are exerted on the regime by the growing society and of the manner in which the leaders try to maintain control, sometimes by partly ceding to such pressures and seeking to canalize them, other times by a sharp frontal counterattack.

The "Permanent" Revolution

Among the most revealing of these variables are Soviet doctrines dealing with the economic role of the state and with the "class struggle" within Soviet society. The underlying reality is that a revolutionary party dictatorship, once it has carried out its original program and by this contributed to the emergence of a new privileged class, is bound to disappear sooner or later—to fall victim to a "Thermidor"—unless it prevents the new upper class from consolidating its position by periodically shaking up the social structure in a "permanent revolution from above." The ideological expression of this problem

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REVISIONISM AND IDEOLOGICAL PURITY

. . . . Under all circumstances the transition from capitalism to socialism can be accomplished only if there is political leadership of society by the working class and its vanguard, only if the political rule of the proletariat is established. After establishing its revolutionary dictatorship, the working class by no means uses it to introduce "total," "pure," or, as the revisionists suggest, "integral democracy," the "free play of political forces," which means freedom of action for counterrevolutionary elements; it uses it to secure the broadest democracy for the working class and to introduce a strong dictatorship in regard to counterrevolutionaries, to enemies of socialism. . . .

Present-day revisionists who call for the building of "their own" socialism apart from the other socialist countries are merely rehashing the bourgeois slogans of "national communism." It is generally true of modern revisionists that they deny the leading role of the USSR in the socialist camp and belittle the great revolutionary experience of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The revisionists propose to substitute the principle of peacefu coexistence for the principles of proletarian internationalism, fraternal cooperation and mutual aid in relations among the socialist countries.

. . . . Both right-wing socialism and contemporary revisionism are the fruit of the same tree—bourgeois ideology. For this reason one of the major conditions for the victorious development of the forces of communism is the implacable struggle of Communists and of the working class of all countries against all manifestations of revisionism and for the purity of Marxist-Leninist ideology.

—From "The Face of Present-Day Revisionism," by A. Butenko, Izvestia, December 28, 1957.

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is the classical doctrine that the dictatorship of the proletariat should gradually "wither away" after it has succeeded in destroying the old ruling classes; thus, if continued dictatorship is to be justified, new goals of social transformation must be set and new "enemies" discovered.

In the early period of Stalin's rule, the new "goal" was the forced collectivization of the Russian countryside; the prosperous peasants—the *kulaks*—took the place of the former landowners and capitalists as the "enemy class" which had to be liquidated. Summing up the achievement in 1937, Stalin wrote in his "Short Course" on party history that collectivization had been a second revolution, but a revolution carried out from above, by state power "with the help of the masses," not just by the masses from below. The ideological groundwork was thus laid for assigning the state a function of continuous economic transformation from above, in addition to its terminable revolutionary task.

The second step, also taken by Stalin in 1937, at the height of the great blood purge, consisted in proclaiming the doctrine that the "class struggle" in the Soviet Union was getting more acute as the "construction of socialism" advanced, because the "enemies" were getting more desperate. This was the ideological justification of the purge itself; at the same time, it was a veiled indication that another revolution from above was in effect taking place, though Stalin refrained this time from trying to define the "enemies" in social terms. In fact, what Stalin accomplished was a mass liquidation of both the bearers of the party's older revolutionary tradition—considered unsuited to the tasks of a bureaucratic state party—and of the most confident and independent-minded elements of the new privileged bureaucracy; the end result was a transformation of the party's social and ideological composition through the mass incorporation of the surviving frightened bureaucrats.

Stalin's final ideological pronouncement was contained in his political testament, "Economic Problems of Socialism," published in 1952. In this work he mapped out a program for the further revolutionary transformation of Soviet society, with the taking over of *kolkhoz* property by the state as its central element.

Khrushchev's Formula for Perpetual Rule

The first major renunciation of these Stalinist ideological innovations was made by Khrushchev in his "secret speech" at the Twentieth Congress. Apart from his factual disclosures concerning Stalin's crimes, he denounced Stalin's doctrine of the sharpening class struggle with societal progress as dangerous nonsense, calculated to lead to the mutual slaughter of loyal Communists after the real class enemy had long been liquidated. This statement affords the master clue to the puzzle of why Khrushchev made the speech: it was a "peace offering" to the leading strata of the regime in the party machine, army, and managerial bureaucracy alike—a response to their pressure for greater personal security. But by his concession, Khrushchev reopened the problem which Stalin's doctrine and practice had been intended to solve—that of preserving and justifying the party dictatorship by periodic major shake-ups of society.

By the spring and summer of 1957, Khrushchev showed his awareness of the practical side of the problem: his dismantling of the economic ministries, breaking up the central economic bureaucracy and strengthening the power of the regional party secretaries, was another such revolutionary shake-up. By November, he responded to the ideological side of the problem. First he repeated, in his solemn speech on the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik seizure of power, his rejection of Stalin's doctrine of ever-sharpening class struggle and ever-present enemies, thus indicating his wish to avoid a return to Stalin's terroristic methods even while following his social recipe of permanent revolution. Then he proceeded to develop his own alternative justification for maintaining the party dictatorship—a unique argument which identified the strengthening of party control with the "withering away of the state" predicted by Lenin.

Reviving this formula for the first time since it was buried by Stalin, Khrushchev explained that the military and police apparatus of the state would have to be maintained as long as a hostile capitalist world existed outside; but he added that the economic and administrative functions of the state bureaucracy would henceforth be steadily reduced by decentralization and devolution, thus strengthening the organs of regional self-government and of national autonomy within the various republics. At the same time, he quietly took steps to strengthen the control of the central party secretariat—his own seat of power—over the republican and regional party organs, thus following the old Leninist principle that the fiction of national autonomy must be balanced by the fact of centralized discipline within the ruling party.

In short, the same aim of maintaining the social dynamism of the party dictatorship and justifying its necessity, which Stalin achieved by exalting the economic role of the state, is pursued by

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Khrushchev by means of the reverse device of claiming that the state's economic functions have begun to "wither away". On the face of it, this doctrinal manipulation seems to reduce the role of ideology to that of ingenious trickery, obscuring rather than reflecting the underlying social realities. Yet in fact, the very need for a change in the ideological argument reflects the change that is taking place in the underlying social situation—the resistance against a return to naked terrorism, the growing desire for a lessening of state pressure and a greater scope for local activity. Whether in industry or agriculture, in the control of literature or in relations with the satellite states, the basic conditions which the regime needs for its self-perpetuation have remained the same—but they can no longer be assured in the same way. That, too, is reflected in the variables of the official ideology.

Soviet Ideologues on the Treadmill

By J. L. H. Keep

THE OFFICIAL PHILOSOPHY of the Soviet Union, "Marxism-Leninism," has long since lost any claim to be regarded as a scientific theory. Whatever Communist propagandists may say to the contrary, the Soviet leaders think and act empirically. Considerations of doctrine are not totally absent from the decision-making process, for the need to preserve orthodoxy sets limits to flexibility and innovation beyond which politicians may venture only at their peril. Basically, however, Soviet ideology is a reflection of Soviet politics. The function of the "court philosophers" of the regime is not to help the politicians to determine their course of action, but to provide suitable theoretical authority for policies which the leadership has decided to adopt. In performing this function the ideologist may manipulate the doctrine but he has no right to *amend* it in the light of observed facts; not only is he committed in advance to support of the party line, but his access to the facts themselves is closely restricted.

Thus, by the very nature of the circumstances in which it is applied, "Marxism-Leninism" is utterly divorced from reality. The ideologist is reduced to the role of a propagandist, endlessly repeating a mumbo-jumbo of exhortative phrases which have been emptied of their original meaning, or conducting futile scholastic debates about the precise interpretation of some phrase in the sacred works. The fundamentals of the doctrine are not open to discussion. No single article of the faith may be discarded, for to do so would bring into question the legitimacy of the regime and undermine its stability. Under Stalin, ideology was the most closely-guarded bastion of the Communist fortress, the keys to which were kept in the dictator's own pocket.

In view of the function performed by ideology in the Soviet system, it is not surprising that the basic doctrine should have remained basically unaltered since Stalin's death. Since changes in practical policies are bound to precede any changes that may occur in doctrine, the ideological field inevitably has been the most rigid sector of the post-Stalin scene. At present the structure of Stalinist orthodoxy remains virtually intact.

The Muscovites of old believed that the earth was supported by three whales; the world of the present-day Marxist-Leninists rests upon belief in three equally mythical concepts: the omnipotence and infallibility of the party, the democratic and socialist nature of Soviet society, and the need for unrelenting hostility to imperialism as it declines to its supposedly inevitable doom. Even the technique employed in the communication of ideas remains unchanged: the theoretician must still hide his meaning in a spate of ritual incantations, or protect himself by

Mr. Keep is Lecturer in Russian History at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London.

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juxtaposing phrases capable of contrary interpretation, while the reader must look for hints, shifts of emphasis, or the omission of some stereotyped remark as a clue to the writer's message.

Yet, although the ideological scene in the Soviet Union today appears to be one of depressing uniformity and stagnation, under the surface the pressure of real life is constantly making itself felt. In many vital respects Stalin's heirs may be said to have displayed a greater sense of realism: when deciding upon a policy, they have been more ready to take account of the extraneous circumstances which may favor or impede its application, instead of insisting blindly upon the implementation of a certain preconceived plan, regardless of cost or consequence. Stalin, especially in his later years, sought to rationalize every act of policy in ideological terms; his successors, on the other hand, appear to have become somewhat disillusioned in the efficacy of ideology as a means of molding men's minds. N. S. Khrushchev in particular, it seems, is a practical-minded individual who prefers to try to work up enthusiasm for governmental policies by arousing expectations of a speedy rise in the standard of living.

Dutifully responding to the new official approach, the ideologists have begun, very hesitantly, to question some of Stalin's theoretical pronouncements. They have not dared to make any important doctrinal innovation; nevertheless, the steps they have taken, trivial as they are, may prove significant as a basis upon which more courageous thinkers could build, if and when the political climate should be more favorable to ideological experiment.

Timid Beginnings of Criticism

The aim of the present article is to examine the high points of the trend to date and to assess their implications. It is not the author's intention to give a full picture of ideological developments since 1953; lack of space prevents consideration of the theoretical repercussions of such important political issues, for example, as the heavy vs. light industry controversy or the various shifts in Soviet foreign policy. The broad question of destalinization can be dealt with only in its primary and most relevant sense—*i.e.*, the revision of Stalin's role as a theorist, upon which any ultimate reappraisal of basic concepts obviously depends.

Stalin's reputation among the ideologists declined immediately after his death: in response to hints or instructions from above, they began to cite Lenin rather than the late leader. Occasionally, references to Stalin's works were made in a manner which, while still expressing approval, managed to suggest that the writers had certain reservations.[1] But the general tendency was to pass over his doctrinal pronouncements in silence. The first open criticism of Stalinist theory was voiced by A. I. Mikoyan at the Twentieth CPSU Congress in February 1956, when he in effect rejected the prediction—put forward in Stalin's 1952 opus on *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*—that the breakdown of a single world market would lead to a decline in production in the imperialist camp.[2] This line of attack, curiously enough, has not been followed up at all vigorously in subsequent discussions.

In his "secret speech" N. S. Khrushchev attacked Stalin for arrogating to himself the sole right to make theoretical pronouncements, but said almost nothing about the content of his theories.[3] The party's theoretical journal *Kommunist*, echoing Khrushchev, came out against Stalin's 1937 thesis on the inevitable sharpening of the class struggle even after the victory of socialism—a concept which had served as an ideological justification for the purges—but kept silent about any other possible errors, apart from charging him rather vaguely with dogmatism.[4] The confusion in higher party echelons was evidenced by the failure of the Twentieth Congress to issue any directive to philosophers comparable with those issued to historians or economists. In the circumstances the ideologists showed an understandable disinclination to jump into the breach and provide the missing answers themselves.

Shortly after the Congress, however, the journal *Voprosy Filosofii* (Problems of Philosophy) was emboldened to point out three more erroneous formulations by Stalin.[5] First, the chapter on dialectical and historical materialism in Stalin's *Short Course* on party history (1938) was said to have encouraged the view that productive forces and production-relations were in full harmony under socialism. This charge was really a derivative of the second—that certain passages in Stalin's aforementioned political testa-

[1] Cf. *Voprosy Filosofii* (Problems of Philosophy), Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Moscow, 1954, No. 5, p. 15; *Kommunist*, theoretical organ of the CPSU, Moscow, 1955, No. 14, p. 48.

[2] *XX Syezd KPSS—Stenograficheskii otchot* (Proceedings of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU), 2 vols., Moscow, 1956, Vol.I, p. 323.

[3] Excerpts from Khrushchev's speech appear in translation in *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1956, pp. 28, 69 ff.

[4] *Kommunist*, 1956, No. 5, p. 13.

[5] *Voprosy Filosofii*, 1956, No. 3, pp. 3–7.

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ment, *Economic Problems of Socialism*, had led people "to run ahead, to see matured contradictions where there were none, and to speak prematurely of the need to merge the two forms of [agricultural—*i.e.*, collective *vs.* state-farm] property. . . ." Finally, Stalin was said to have taken, in his *Marxism and Questions of Linguistics* (1950), a simplified view of the process of liquidating the superstructure of capitalist society during the transition to socialism. The last two points merit a closer examination.

Utopia Postponed

The criticisms launched against Stalin's political testament gave formal doctrinal sanction to a trend which had been taking place in practice ever since 1953. In his last work Stalin had clearly indicated a reckless ambition to realize as quickly as possible his "vision of Utopia", a fully Communist society (the "Communist" state he envisaged was, of course, far removed from the old Marxist dream).[6] He called for a new offensive against the peasants: collective farms were to be "raised to the level of public property," and an immediate start was to be made on the introduction of "products exchange"—that is, payment of farmers in industrial goods instead of cash for part of their deliveries to the state. Stalin may possibly even have contemplated giving formal sanction to that purely "declarative" achievement of communism which he attributed to the economist Yaroshenko: for Yaroshenko's (real or alleged) view that the state was now powerful enough to "organize" communism was simply a logical deduction from the extreme voluntarism in vogue at the time, for which Stalin himself was chiefly responsible.[7]

It is no mere coincidence that in his "secret speech" Khrushchev singled out agriculture as the sphere in which Stalin's errors had produced the most harmful effects.[8] Unlike Stalin, the new rulers could not afford to ignore the critical economic situation; they were obliged to concentrate upon remedying past failures instead of undertaking grandiose new schemes of development as was Stalin's wont. Consolidation rather than advance was now the watchword. The trumpetings about the emergence of "new Soviet man" were muted, and Stalin's extravagant plans for the "transformation of nature" quietly allowed to lapse. Khrushchev's agricultural drives, although not devoid of a certain touch of megalomania, are basically related to the post-Stalin regime's general aim of effecting an immediate improvement in agricultural production and living standards. Examples of the new leadership's more realistic and less ideologically-minded approach might be drawn from several other fields of domestic policy.

Since Stalin's death theoreticians have preferred to emphasize the obstacles preventing the speedy achievement of communism rather than the ease with which it could be introduced. In 1950 Ts. A. Stepanyan, the leading authority on the subject, had declared that "communism is not a matter of the distant future." [9] The shift away from this attitude by 1953 was voiced, among other theorists, by A. Feodorova, who cautioned that the transition process would require "a fairly long time" and described the function of the party not as "building communism" in the accepted formula, but only as "preparing the material and spiritual prerequisites for it." By implication Feodorova criticized the attempt to inculcate a "Communist attitude to labor" artificially, by means of state-sponsored "socialist emulation" campaigns; mass enthusiasm, she inferred, was no substitute as an incentive for personal material interest.[10]

Stepanyan, trimming his sails to catch the fresh breeze, and nailing a long-forgotten quotation from Lenin to his masthead, boldly headed part of an article, "Lenin on an all-round increase in the prosperity of the people as the most important task in building communism," and even dared to say that "the transition to communism means building more houses." [11] Another writer denounced disregard for personal interest as "leftism" against which the party was still obliged to struggle; he recalled an incident from the 1920's when a certain over-zealous community had tried to "introduce communism" within its own

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[6] Stalin's concept of a communist society, through subtle distortions of the original doctrine, carefully allowed for the perpetuation of the state (complete with the most odious features of his own regime), in disregard of Marxist theory on the "withering away" of the state. *Cf.* Geroid T. Robinson, "Stalin's Vision of Utopia: The Future Communist Society," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Philadelphia, Vol. 99, No. 1, January 1955, pp. 11–21.

[7] "Voluntarism" may be defined as the belief that progress is achieved by the active application of the human will, in contradistinction to "determinism", which views all progress as a result of social processes operating independently of human volition in accordance with predetermined historical laws.

[8] See The *Anti-Stalin Campaign* . . . ," pp. 77–79.

[9] Ts. A. Stepanyan, *I. V. Stalin o stroitelstve kommunizma v SSSR* (I. V. Stalin on the building of communism in the USSR), Moscow, 1950, p. 45.

[10] A. Feodorova, in *Kommunist*, 1953, No. 17, p. 89.

[11] Stepanyan, "V. I. Lenin o stroitelstve kommunizma" (V. I. Lenin on the building of communism), *Kommunist*, 1954, No. 6, pp. 38, 41.

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boundaries.[12] The link with pre-1953 policies at the national level was only tacitly implied; it was left to an untutored contributor to an obscure provincial paper to state the connection openly.[13]

IN LINE WITH the new shift, an article in *Kommunist* referred to the institution of "products exchange" as "a long-range prospect . . . which can be attained only in the future, upon the foundation of a tremendous growth of productive forces. . . ." The writer invoked the dicta of Marx and Engels against attempting to jump over uncompleted stages of development, covering himself by praising Stalin's *Economic Problems of Socialism*, while rebuking some minor figure who had simply repeated the dictator's conclusions.[14] The new official economic textbook, published in 1954, finally buried the "products exchange" concept, reverting to the pre-1952 formula: "Trade will remain the basic form of the distribution of consumer goods during the whole period of the gradual transition to communism." [15]

There was also a noticeable shift in opinion with regard to the method by which communism was to be introduced. In 1950 Stepanyan had declared:

The most important condition for solving the task of building communism is the strengthening in every way of the Soviet state; . . . the Soviet state was the main tool for building socialism; it has become an even more powerful tool for building the higher phase of communism.[16]

After Stalin's death, however, the state came under fire for its "inadequate mass basis"—in plain language, its failure to inspire widespread popular support—and had to be replaced as the guiding force of the society by the party, the self-appointed vanguard of the people. (One of the objectives of the 1953–4 campaign on "the masses as the creators of history" was to accentuate the role of the party.)

Perhaps more striking than what *was* said was the general de-emphasis on the whole topic of the advent of communism. The steady flow of literature on this theme during Stalin's last years diminished to a trickle by 1954. After an article in September 1955, evidently the work of a Stalinist die-hard (he referred to Stalin as Lenin's "comrade-in-arms," an expression no longer in general use by that time),[17] *Kommunist* virtually ignored the subject.

In his report to the Twentieth CPSU Congress, Khrushchev gave a new sense of urgency to the drive to bring propaganda and agitation themes closer to life. He referred scornfully to the "hotheads" who believed that the building of socialism was already completed and who wanted to force the pace of transition to communism. The old slogan "forward to communism" seemed to be repeated more for form's sake than from burning conviction. The impression Khrushchev gave of the present position of society was cautious in the extreme, as well as vague:

We have climbed up the mountain to a height from which we can already see broad perspectives on the way to our ultimate aim, a Communist society.[18]

In short, Utopia has been postponed. It is possible that in the course of time Stalin's early idea of effecting communism in one country, which has come to wear a somewhat tarnished look in the postwar world, may even be condemned as an "adventurist" deviation.

Stalin and the Capitalist Heritage

The last charge of error levelled against Stalin in the *Voprosy Filosofii* article, concerning certain of his views on the "superstructure" of capitalist societies, has led to a public discussion in which the final word is probably still to be said.[19] A month after the

[12] G. Glezerman, "Pravilnoe sochetanie obshchestvennykh i lichnykh interesov—neobkhodimoe uslovie stroitelstva kommunizma" (The correct coordination of social and personal interests—an essential condition for the building of communism), *Kommunist*, 1954, No. 4, pp. 22–37.

[13] *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, Tashkent, April 15, 1956.

[14] A. Vishnyakov, "K voprosu o dialektike razvitiia sotsialisticheskovo obshchestva" (Concerning the dialectics of the development of socialist society), *Kommunist*, 1953, No. 10, p. 32.

[15] *Politicheskaia Ekonomiia—Uchebnik* (Textbook on Political Economy), Moscow, 1954, p. 569.

[16] Stepanyan, *I. V. Stalin o stroitelstve kommunizma v SSSR*, p. 24.

[17] D. Nalkocheyev, "Leninskii plan stroitelstva kommunizma v SSSR" (Lenin's plan for building communism in the USSR), *Kommunist*, 1955, No. 13, pp. 13–27.

[18] Proceedings of the Twentieth Congress, Vol. I, p. 115. A revealing picture of public apathy over the "transition to communism" question is given by A. Korneichuk in his play *Krylia* (Wings), the dramatic manifesto of the "thaw" period: the personnel of a Machine-Tractor Station, drawn from their work for a boring talk on this subject, interrupt the lecturer with awkward or irreverent questions. (A. Korneichuk, *Sochineniia* [Works], Moscow, 1956, Vol. III, pp. 187–90).

[19] According to Communist theory, the political, legal, moral, philosophical and religious institutions and ideas obtaining in any society constitute its "superstructure", which is determined by that society's economic "basis". In an "antagonistic", *e.g.* capitalist, society, it is held, the basis is unstable, owing to the contradiction between expanding productive forces and obsolete production-relations; changes in the basis are reflected by changes in the "superstructure", and ultimately result in its collapse. In a "non-antagonistic" socialist society such as the Soviet Union, on the other hand, the new "superstructure" corresponds to the new "basis", and takes an active part in transforming it, *e.g.* by state planning and control of economic expansion.

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article appeared, *Kommunist* further developed its criticisms in a trio of studies, the most noteworthy of which was an article by assistant editor M. D. Kammari entitled "Some Questions of the Theory of Basis and Superstructure" (the other contributions were a slightly apologetic defense of "Soviet democracy" and an authoritative exposition of the post-Twentieth Congress line on the rewriting of party history").[20]

Kammari began his essay by trying to exempt certain Western ideas and institutions from the wholesale condemnation heaped upon them by Stalin. "After the appearance of Stalin's *Marxism and Questions of Linguistics*," he asserted, "many of our philosophers, including the author of this article, considered that one should include in the concept of superstructure of an antagonistic society only the ideas and institutions of the ruling class"—a qualification which, it was inferred, Stalin had not considered. The ideas and institutions created by the exploited classes, Kammari maintained, cannot be considered as existing in order to defend the interests of their rulers; hence a distinction must be made between the superstructure as a whole and that part of it which does in fact serve the ruling class.

Going further, he claimed that each element in the superstructure has an individuality of its own and can move independently of the other elements; they do not all necessarily come into conflict with the basis at the same time. Thus capitalism had been replaced by a new "basis", imperialism, yet capitalist democracy, appropriate to the old order, may still be found under the new. (The choice of this example was perhaps not entirely fortuitous.) A long delay may occur before a change in the basis is followed by changes in all the elements of the superstructure; some are carried over from one epoch to another.

In short, "Stalin's thesis that a superstructure is the product of a single epoch, the epoch during which its appropriate economic basis exists and functions, needs to be made more precise and concrete. . . ." Stalin had rightly spoken of language surviving from one epoch to another, but this was true of many other superstructural elements as well; his formula had led to "nihilistic" or "sectarian" attitudes toward the achievements of bourgeois society; it was time to recall the qualifying phrase in the original Marxist formula that superstructural changes occur "*more or less* rapidly after changes in the basis."

Kammari was clearly more disposed to defend Stalin than to expose his errors, to forestall more radical criticism than to lead the attack. The pretense was maintained that Stalin had been guilty only of a careless slip which had confused his disciples. Much of the argument was trite in the extreme. But the significance of his views is enhanced by the fact that they were made the object of a general theoretical discussion in ensuing months, indicating that they were put up as a *ballon d'essai*.

The Emergence of an Official "Line"

In March 1957 some of the opinions vented in this discussion were published in *Kommunist*, together with an official commentary.[21] The authors (who for convenience can be called the Kammari group—possibly they may be identical with the editorial board of *Kommunist*) came out strongly in support of Kammari's views, which were now clarified and developed in some respects, clearly indicating that they had the sanction of the regime. The charge of error now seemed to be levelled somewhat more directly against Stalin himself, and was given a formal label ("the theory of the single-class nature of the superstructure")—always a landmark in the development of any Communist anti-deviationist campaign.

An apparent attempt was made to underscore the specific applicability of the views advanced in *Marxism and Questions of Linguistics* to the field of philology, the inference being that the more far-reaching implications of Stalin's thesis, upon which such emphasis was laid in 1950, were no longer to be considered valid.

An important aspect of the *Kommunist* articles was the surreptitious extension of Kammari's earlier argument to cover the role of the superstructure in *socialist* as well as capitalist society. Previously Kammari had expressed agreement with the general thesis of Stalin's essay, but the later writers took pains to dissociate themselves from the voluntarism which was its main characteristic. They reminded readers of the orthodox Marxist principle that a socialist superstructure "cannot be built in a day" but could only develop as a result of changes in the economic basis of society; the clear implication was that Stalin had taken an over-simplified view of the job of "building socialism" in the USSR, trying to force it through by pressure from above, instead of allowing events to take a more gradual and natural course.

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[20] *Kommunist*, 1956, No. 10, pp. 42–58.

[21] "Za tvorcheskoe izuchenie i razrabotku teorii bazisa i nadstroiki" (For creative study of the theory of basis and superstructure), *Kommunist*, 1957, No. 4, pp. 46–58.

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In their critical remarks, the *Kommunist* writers indirectly revealed the tenor of opposition views; significantly, the edge of criticism was directed against the so-called "doctrinaires" who still adhere completely to Stalinist positions, rather than against those theoreticians who have shown an inclination to overthrow more idols than Kammari. A number of participants in the debate were cited by name in the attempt to expound and refute their errors. One critic, Grudinin, apparently had gone to the length of introducing the concept of *partiinost* in an effort to brand Kammari as anti-party. The Higher Party School in Moscow (where selected higher-level party members take "refresher courses" in ideology) seems to have been something in the nature of a Stalinist strongpoint: some of its staff maintained that Kammari's argument implied that the capitalist superstructure was created, not by the dominant class as had always been thought, but by both exploiters and exploited in collaboration. Since Kammari had explicitly affirmed the view that there was only one superstructure and not two (one proletarian and one bourgeois), it might seem to an impartial observer that the Stalinists had logic on their side. The Kammari group no doubt recognized this too, for their sole defense was a countercharge that their critics had employed "formal logic"—that crude but effective club with which Soviet ideologists are wont to beat the heads of those who ask awkward questions. Their reply provides further evidence, if it is needed, that the outcome of such disputes is determined not by the intrinsic quality of the arguments employed, but by relative political power.

The *Kommunist* symposium revealed the existence of at least two other points of view more radical than that of the Kammari group. A certain Levi and his associates were said to have sought to exclude ideas from the superstructure altogether; if so, this would represent an attempt to challenge the views, not merely of Stalin, but of Marx. And a theoretician named Pomeransky was said to have argued that the economic basis of socialism could develop within the capitalist economic structure, a statement which would seem to identify him as holding a reformist gradualist position. Both of these men were treated with remarkable leniency; their errors were politely pointed out as though of no importance, whereas the arguments of the Stalinists were subjected to more detailed analysis. In neither case, however, was there any indication of an impending heresy hunt.

Future Outlook: Stormy?

The Kammari group obviously had the backing of the top party leadership, and presumably their views continue in favor today. The significance of last year's debate definitely should not be exaggerated, however. In the first place, there is no guarantee whatsoever that the Kammari line will prevail for any length of time. This depends almost entirely upon the political situation at the summit. The emergence of a strong man in the Kremlin may be expected to result in changes of ideas (and possibly also of personnel) in the ideological field. A definitive official ruling on the extent of Stalin's errors must be given without undue delay.

In the second place, the moves that have so far been made toward a reappraisal of basic concepts represent a pathetically feeble attempt to break through the wall of dogma—pathetic both in comparison to the amount of ground that remains to be covered before ideology can be made even slightly less remote from reality, and in comparison to the progress made in this respect elsewhere within the Soviet orbit. These moves must be seen in perspective, against the background of the regime's basic hostility to any genuine degree of free expression among writers, artists or historians. Since the 1956 Hungarian revolution in particular, the party has been repeating *ad nauseam* its claim to exercise complete thought control. Moscow's rabid attacks against so-called "revisionism" or "national communism" in Eastern Europe are an indication of its uneasiness, indeed alarm, over the trend of events. It is not mere speculation to anticipate that the developments now taking place both inside and outside the Soviet Union will sooner or later compel the Kremlin to give its ideologists new directives. Yet unless these are formulated with some deference to common sense and reality, they will not long be able to shore up the clumsy edifice of ideology against the winds of freer thought now stirring in the Communist world.

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Peiping's Growing Dilemma—Population

By E. Stuart Kirby

THE ENORMOUS SIZE of mainland China's population is a matter of common knowledge. Probably numbering by now around 625,000,000, it already may represent as much as a quarter of the whole human race and is mounting at a rapid rate. On the other hand, the stores of natural resources within China's borders is limited, constituting relatively a much smaller fraction of total world resources. This disparity between human numbers and available resources confronts the nation's rulers, now Communist, with a vast and inescapable problem.

That the Mao regime has begun to face up to the realities of the problem is attested to by the fact that it is now actively encouraging curbs on population growth which, as late as 1954, Peiping—no less than Moscow—was loudly condemning as contrary to the basic tenets and spirit of Marxism. Artificial methods of birth control, officially denounced during 1949–54 as a "reactionary" and "anti-humanitarian" device of capitalism, are at present being propagated through a concerted campaign designed to "popularize" their use among the masses. Even abortion, which—despite a somewhat checkered history in the Soviet Union—had generally been condemned by the Communists as the least acceptable form of birth control, has received broad legal sanction under new regulations issued by the Peiping government last May.

Thus, there have been two diametrically opposite phases of Chinese Communist policy on birth control since 1949, each reflecting a different outlook and approach to the population problem. The vigorous condemnation of birth control through 1954 was part of the optimistic, self-confident outlook of the regime's early years, which expressed itself in a doctrinaire stand based on Marxist population principles. Since 1955, the shift to increasingly open and positive encouragement of birth control practices reflects a retreat from Marxist dogma in favor of a more practical, realistic approach to the whole population problem.

Dr. Kirby is Professor of Economics at the University of Hong Kong and editor of Contemporary China, *an authoritative compilation of economic and social studies on Communist China published in Hong Kong. He writes frequently for British publications on Chinese Communist economic affairs.*

The Phase of Marxist Orthodoxy

At first, the Communist regime paid little or no attention to birth control or the whole question of population policy. Then, what references were made to them by official spokesmen from 1951 through 1954 largely took the form of boastful assertions of Marxian dogma denying the applicability of Malthusian theories of over-population to socialist society.

In the orthodox Marxist view, since labor is the sole source of value, the proletariat represents the creative and progressive class *par excellence*. Under socialism, therefore, the existence of a large working population is thoroughly desirable and constitutes a guarantee of ample production and economic progress. Under capitalism, on the contrary, the fruits of production are wrested away from the workers by the propertied minority, whose interest lies in preventing or impeding social improvement in order to preserve its "monopoly" position. Malthusianism (whether old or new) and birth control are simply devices whereby the capitalist class seeks to prevent the workers from realizing these basic "truths" and delude them into attributing their poverty to inexorable natural laws—the human propensity to multiply

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beyond the limits of the world's supply of resources—rather than to its "real cause", the capitalist system.

The emphasis placed on this orthodox Marxist population line was influenced by certain other motives which led Chinese Communist spokesmen actually to exult in, and even exaggerate, the magnitude and continued rapid growth of the population. Statements boasting of a high or rising rate of population increase were evidently considered of immediate propaganda usefulness as "proof" to the outside world of popular confidence in the Communist regime and of improved living conditions compared to those which existed under Nationalist rule (reflected especially in a claimed reduction of the death rate).

Playing up the size of the population was also used by the regime as a domestic morale booster. By stressing that China alone accounted for one quarter of the world's population, and all the Communist countries together for one third, the regime encouraged popular belief that the national strength of Communist China in particular, and the international strength of the "socialist camp" as a whole, were such that the enemies of communism must necessarily fear to attack. Very possibly also, such statements reflected a natural psychological urge to emphasize China's importance within the Communist bloc, where—in terms of population at least—she is by far the leading power, outnumbering the Soviet "big brother" by some three to one.

Strength Through Numbers

All these motivations, ideological and propagandistic, were repeatedly evidenced during the period from 1951 to 1954. In statements by Mao and other Chinese Communist leaders and in the organs of the party press, China's "hundreds of millions of people" were constantly referred to as the country's treasured asset. As the central party newspaper, *Jen-min jih-pao*, put it in a 1952 article representative of the official pronouncements of this period, "man is the most precious form of capital in the world"—a statement which it prefaced with the words "as Stalin has told us" in conformity with Peiping's then still pronounced attitude of humble obeisance to Moscow. The article further denounced birth control as just "a means of killing off the Chinese people without shedding blood."[1]

One factor that may well have contributed to the dogmatic stand of the regime during this period was the evident lack of any accurate knowledge of the real size of the population. In 1953, however, the Communist government undertook to carry out the first scientifically-conducted census ever attempted in China, the compilation of the census data taking until June 1954 and resulting in population figures purported to be fully accurate. The figures, not publicly announced until November 1, 1954, revealed a total population, including Taiwan and overseas Chinese, of just over 600,000,000 (as of June 30, 1953), of which no less than 574,000,000 were within mainland China.[2] The latter figure was far greater than had hitherto been supposed even by the Communist authorities, whose estimates had generally remained below 500,000,000.[3]

Although the implications of this discovery undoubtedly caused some serious thinking which contributed to the later shift in regime policy, there was no immediate alteration of the official line as set forth above. Indeed, on November 1, 1954, simultaneously with the disclosure of the census results, an official of the Census Bureau restated the regime's viewpoint on population in the following "orthodox" terms:[4]

The existence of over 600,000,000 people is the source of wealth of our great country and the basis of its socialist reconstruction. . . . In the People's Democracies, man is the most precious form of capital, the master of his fate, the conscious creator of his own happiness. . . . [We Chinese represent] a quarter of the human race. . . . Under the reactionary Kuomintang government, bad material conditions coupled with social and public insecurity led to a high death rate and a low rate of natural increase. . . . After the liberation, the rate of natural increase rose considerably owing to the restoration and development of production, the improvement of the people's material conditions, and progress in medicine and hygiene.

The statement then cited the census figures subdividing the population by age-group and sex, adding:

All these figures prove that children living in the age of Mao Tse-tung are carefully looked after and benefit from favorable conditions of life. The era of poverty, sickness and ignorance is no more. The time when girls were maltreated or drowned is gone. . . .

The same official sought to explain lower population growth rates in capitalist countries on the fanciful grounds that "capitalism, by diminishing the purchasing power of the masses, and by weakening them through subjection to wretched conditions, is the cause of increased mortality." Finally, he denounced

[1] *Jen-min jih-pao* (Peiping), April 25, 1952.

[2] For a full discussion of the census, see "Population Problems of China" (three articles) in *Contemporary China*, Vol. I, pp. 32–46.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 38.

[4] Statement by Pai Chien-hua, in *Jen-min jih-pao*, November 1, 1954.

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as "hardly worth contradicting" the horrified claims of "the bankrupt hangers-on of Malthus" that China could not support 600,000,000 people and therefore must inevitably resort to external aggression. Although some difficulties might be experienced in the short run, he asserted, "the excellence of our social system" will permit them to be easily overcome, and "when we have achieved our socialist construction, unemployment will be eliminated and the people guaranteed a happy life as in the Soviet Union."

Influences for Change

The first indications of a major change in Chinese Communist policy regarding the population problem began to manifest themselves from about the end of 1954. Several different influences or tendencies, some new and others which had been gathering momentum even before that date, combined to produce a gradual trend away from the rigid and naive orthodoxy of the earlier period in the direction of a more realistic, hard-headed approach.

Of first importance, undoubtedly, was the regime's growing realization of the economic implications of the huge population figure revealed by the 1953 census and the rapid rate of increase—12,000,000 per year—shown by related demographic studies.[5] The Chinese Communist leadership was compelled to recognize that the new system of planned economy faced a gigantic task in providing for even the simplest living needs of such an enormous population, a task rendered still more formidable by the regime's proposal to carry out rapid, large-scale industrialization. In 1956–57 especially, major difficulties were experienced in carrying out the first Five-Year Plan, and grave discontent arose as a result of the shortfall in the production of consumer goods and housing, the poor quality of the commodities produced, and general deficiencies in living conditions. So widespread was the dissatisfaction that the regime found itself compelled to make drastic revisions in the second Five-Year Plan (which entered into operation this year) so as to allow a somewhat higher proportion of investment in light, or consumer goods, industries, with a corresponding scaling-down of some of the goals for heavy industry expansion.[6] At the same time, these economic strains were clearly effective in bringing home to the leadership the need for concurrent practical measures to check population growth.

A second element which influenced the 1955 change of line was the fact that, even during the period when the party publicly denounced the general practice of birth control as anti-Marxist, the Communists themselves, as a social stratum, were freely resorting to it in their personal lives. The use of contraceptive methods had long been thoroughly countenanced by the party for all persons in the category of "cadres" since they were extremely hard-worked and it was considered desirable, in the party's own interest, that they should be as free as possible from such personal or emotional ties and impediments as the possession of large families entails. Some very interesting and acute observations bearing out the prevalence of birth control practices among the party elite were recorded by the British Labor Party leader, Mr. Aneurin Bevan, during his 1954 visit to Communist China.[7]

The same considerations tended to influence the party toward extending its tacit approval of these practices by the cadres to other categories of key personnel—that is, to all administrative, technical and professional personnel engaged in work vital to the functioning of the state economic and social machinery, who were as hard-pressed as the party cadres by the tasks of "socialist construction." Just as in "bourgeois" society, therefore, birth control practices tended to spread from the "upper", better-educated levels downward or outward into the general population.

Assault on the Family

The two factors or influences discussed above were primarily of a practical nature, impelling the regime to modify its birth control policy from the standpoint of actual and immediate needs, economic and organizational. There was, however, another factor more directly related to the basic, long-range Communist goal of achieving the complete socialist transformation of Chinese society. This was the necessity, recognized as vital by the Mao regime, of using every means to destroy the institutional foundations and the moral and ethical values of the traditional social order—all antithetical to Communist ideology and objectives.

The cornerstone of the old society was the traditional family system, philoprogenitive and conjoint

[5] The 12,000,000 figure is based on the official birth and death rates (37 and 17 per thousand, respectively) announced by Pai Chien-hua, *ibid.*

[6] See the author's series of articles, entitled "The Basis of Light Industry in China," in *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), March 28, 1957, and following issues.

[7] Quoted in the author's "The People of China, Census Results and Population Policies," *Family Planning* (London), July 1956.

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in character—that is, a system essentially characterized by large, tightly-knit families. It consequently became one of the first targets of the Communists' frontal attack on the old order. The attack opened with the promulgation of the "New Marriage Law" of 1950, which struck such a sharp blow at the traditional concepts of marital and family relationships that some Communists demurred on the ground that the country was not yet ready for it. They were, however, sharply overridden by Mao Tse-tung, who pronounced the measure "next in importance only to the great Fundamental Law" (the Constitution).[8] The high importance ascribed by Mao was itself a clue to the law's broad underlying purpose, summed up by an eminent Chinese sociologist in these words:

The Communist victory in 1949 brought the government of a party deeply pledged to shattering the very foundations of Chinese society. . . . The institutions of marriage and the family have been redefined in terms of the class struggle. Sex is no longer a private, personal matter; love is no longer an individual affair. The marriage relationship is neither a biological union nor a psychological unity, but a grim necessity, historically and materially conditioned.[9]

Among the many detailed facets of the New Marriage Law, its redefinition of the "duties of husband and wife" is of particular pertinence to the present discussion.[10] Article 8 states: "Husband and wife are in duty bound to love, respect, assist and look after each other, to live in harmony, to labor for production, to care for the children, to strive jointly for the welfare of the family and the building of the new society." To the normal intramarital duties of the partners, the Communists thus added two significant extramarital obligations which have been very heavily stressed by the party: the duty of both husband and wife "to labor for production" (*i.e.*, to serve actively in the state economic machine) and "to strive for . . . the building of the new society" (*i.e.*, to give positive, unconditional support to all regime policies). These stipulations clearly reflected another vital purpose of Chinese Communist family policy, namely to assure maximum "social mobility" and hence maximum availability of productive labor-power, both male and female, for accomplishing the gigantic tasks of "socialist construction."

Thus, the Communists sought to undermine and break up the old family system with the dual objective of eliminating it as the chief pillar of conservative resistance to the socialization of the whole of Chinese life, and of creating the kind of social mobility necessary to the functioning of a centrally planned and directed system of economy. In the Marxist view, capitalism depends for its existence upon a large class of people kept deprived of ties of property; but while this view is plainly challenged by fact, all evidence supports the conclusion that the Communist system itself cannot exist without a large proletariat, one not only deprived of property but "liberated" also, as far as possible, from previously-accepted social and moral restraints and from ties of family—in short, a proletariat peculiarly conditioned for regimented labor at the state's command.

The more perceptive of the architects of Chinese Communist policy undoubtedly came to see that birth control could serve as a useful supplementary weapon for the achievement of these objectives. The limitation of offspring would tend to weaken one of the key foundations of the traditional unity and cohesiveness of the Chinese family. At the same time, since large families interfered with the availability of the parents (especially the wives) for productive labor and other "duties" to the state, a reduction of family size was obviously desirable, if not necessary, to provide the maximum social mobility required by the system.

Emergence of the New Line

Such were the three main influences or motivations which played a part in the gradual reorientation of Chinese Communist population policy after 1954. Already, before the end of that year, veteran birth control advocates like Shao Li-tzu, who had carried on a limited and discreet propaganda for their ideas all through the period of Marxist orthodoxy, began to speak out more frankly and boldly in favor of practical measures of family limitation.[11] However, the first clear sign of an official change of attitude was the publication in party propaganda organs, early in 1955, of articles giving the public "a correct comprehension of the problems of birth control and contraception."[12] The gist of the explanations was that the party not only did not oppose the

[8] S. L. Fu, "The New Marriage Law of Communist China," *Contemporary China*, Vol. I, 1955 (Oxford University Press), p. 122.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 115.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 129.

[11] See speech by Shao Li-tzu at the National People's Congress, reported in *Jen-min jih pao*, September 18, 1954; also, Shao's article, "Concerning the Problem of the Dissemination of Knowledge about Contraception," *Kuang-ming jih-pao*, December 19, 1954.

[12] Chou o-fen, "How to Treat the Question of Contraception," *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien*, (China Youth), No. 4, February 16, 1955.

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practice of birth control, but viewed the popular "demand" for it as "reasonable" and worthy of support.

This initial relaxation of the official line was followed, during 1955 and increasingly through 1956–57, by active efforts on the part of the Ministry of Public Health to establish wider clinical and other facilities for the dissemination of birth control advice and information, and to assure the availability of contraceptive supplies through state-operated pharmaceutical outlets. Thousands of birth control clinics and information centers on modern lines are now in operation. In the fall of 1956, moreover, the government ordered the launching of a major national campaign of public education in birth control methods, and every available means is currently being employed to hasten and broaden this drive.[13]

The vigor and intensity of the campaign afford striking evidence of how far Chinese Communist practical policy has departed from the old Marxist dogma which denounced birth control as a capitalist conspiracy to "kill off the Chinese people without shedding blood." From this standpoint, the following eye-witness description of birth control propaganda in Shanghai in June 1957 is illuminating:

> **On bill boards, in the most crowded places all over the town, in the windows of stores, inside and outside of clinics, there are displays of the human anatomy, posters spreading information on conception and popularizing the methods aimed at prevention of births. . . .**
>
> **. . . . the change from complete taboo to open encouragement has occurred overnight, so to say, without any intermediate stages and preparations.**
>
> **Where but recently there hung pictorial displays of the blessedness that the new marriage law was supposed to bring to the populace, . . . where children were a blessing and were encouraged by the state, now hang strip pictures portraying the hardships of parents overburdened by large families, and in consequence living in financial misery, lacking in nightly sleep, and not having enough time for cultural life. Alongside are displayed practical suggestions how to prevent conception with the aid of contraceptives, chemical and mechanical. These displays, which leave nothing to the imagination, are equally accessible to matured people and to youngsters of all ages, and it is not uncommon to see groups of children gathered around and discussing the pictures.[14]**

There have been some interesting and humorous developments in the course of the campaign. Along with the propagation of modern scientific techniques of contraception, the public health authorities seriously explored the use of traditional Chinese medicines and the formulas of herbalists, while Dr. Yei Hsi-chun, a deputy to the 1956 National People's Congress, prescribed with equal seriousness a natural contraceptive "which one can find anywhere in fish ponds or ditches around the time of the Spring Festival . . . women are advised to swallow live tadpoles three to five days after menstruation." [15]

The culminating step in the reversal of official policy came with the issuance by the Ministry of Public Health, on May 15, 1957, of revised regulations governing abortion and sterilization. The effect of the new regulations was to reduce the previous requirements for obtaining both types of operation so drastically as to be tantamount to virtually blanket legalization.[16] In fact, the official announcement was followed by such a "rush" of applicants for abortions that the Minister of Public Health, Madame Li Teh-ch'uan, made a statement deploring the situation and calling for more propaganda to teach people that "artificial expulsion should be avoided . . . for health reasons" and that "best of all is contraception." She added the interesting disclosure that most of the abortion applicants were Communist women cadres, and urged the Democratic Women's Federation to make special efforts to "educate them in this matter."[17]

Ideology *vs.* Practice

Thus, the Mao regime's practical policy with respect to population checks has steadily progressed, since early 1955, from an initially lukewarm, passive acceptance of birth control practices—allegedly prompted by "the demand of the masses"—to an all-out nationwide effort to indoctrinate the masses from above.[18] This evolution has brought the regime's practical approach to the problem into patent conflict

[13] Some interesting facts and figures bearing on the scope of the campaign and its progress were reported in *Wen Hui Pao* (Shanghai), November 29, 1957.

[14] "Shanghai Newsletter," *South China Morning Post* (Hong Kong), June 15, 1957.

[15] *News of Population and Birth Control* (in Chinese), October 1956 (cited in *Quarterly Bulletin*, Family Planning Association of Hong Kong, December 1956).

[16] The only requirement for abortion under the new regulations is medical certification that the applicant is not more than three months pregnant, has not had an abortion in the past year, and that no complications are likely. See Ministry of Public Health notification on abortion and sterilization, reported in summary by New China News Agency, May 18, 1957.

[17] Reported in *Kuang-ming jih-pao*, June 4, 1957.

[18] From the start of the 1955 shift in policy, the regime sought to present it as a concession to popular pressure in favor of birth control; *e. g.*, see Chou O-Fen, *op. cit.* This claim has been soft-pedalled since the launching of the birth control campaign, but the official line still stresses that family limitation is a matter of individual choice and disclaims any desire to impose it.

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with its ideological stand, which has proved much more resistant to change. To cite one example, as late as December 1956, a Communist theoretician writing on the population question bitterly attacked the pessimistic views of such contemporary Western scientists as Julian Huxley and Messrs. Pearson and Hubbard, of Cornell University, regarding the threat of world over-population, and even echoed the old, undiluted propaganda line in these words:

Six hundred million! . . . Cause for us to rejoice, excellent news for all the peoples on the side of democracy and peace . . . [19]

As a general rule, however, there has been an evident attempt on the part of Chinese Communist ideologists to adjust the party theoretical line so as to make room within its framework for the regime's adoption of practical measures to combat over-population. The contradictions in which this effort has entangled the party theoreticians are nowhere more apparent than in an article published in the principal Chinese Communist organ of ideological discussion, *Hsueh Hsi* (Study), in October 1955.

On the one hand, its author, Yang Ssu-ying, unequivocally reaffirmed the validity of Marx's and Engels' views on population, which he said completely "exploded" the theories of Malthus. Communist China, he asserted, has no fears whatever of becoming overpopulated because socialism has "a new law of population: a continuous and rapid increase in numbers accompanied by a relatively greater rise in the material well-being of the people." He likewise voiced the usual denunciations of Western scholars and statesmen, and termed the "reactionary theory of over-population" a weapon "used by the Imperialists . . . against the Chinese people and their Revolution."

On the other hand, however, Yang proceeded to argue that the publicity being given to birth control methods (then still on a relatively small scale) was "necessary as well as proper." It was nowise inspired by the belief that China was overpopulated, he claimed, and "has no point in common with Malthus' theory at all." The author then tried to make a fine distinction between general overpopulation and too large individual families. Given the still "rather backward" state of the economy and of general welfare facilities, he added,

. . . the fact that there are too many children in a family unduly increases the burden of the parents and affects adversely their work, their study of political doctrines, and their general livelihood . . . . In view of the above, in order to lessen the difficulties currently facing us, to protect the health [of mothers], and finally to ensure that the next generation may be brought up better, we are not at all opposed to birth control.[20]

SUCH INGENIOUS sophistry, however, cannot gloss over the plain fact that the Chinese Communists, faced by general and grave conditions of economic hardship, have had to swallow their boasts about the immunity of the socialist system to the menace of overpopulation, and about their capacity to raise the living standards of the people regardless of the rate of population increase. This is implicit in the regime's all-out campaign to promote the widest possible acceptance of birth control practices, and it spells a retreat by Peiping from one of the basic theorems and attitudes of Marxism, no matter how the regime may try to disguise it.

The matter is urgent for China. On top of the long-term prospect of what has been described as "suffocation by crowding" or "standing-room only"—by the Orwellian year of 1984 the population is expected to reach 2,000,000,000—is superimposed a present crisis of shortages in the Communist system of planned economy, as well as some disillusionment about the adequacy of China's material resources. The boasting and over-optimism of the first years of the regime have largely evaporated, giving way to greater caution and realism.

Times change, and as the practical tasks and difficulties confronting the Chinese Communists loom larger, Marxist dogma is left behind.

[19] Wang Ya-nan, *Marxist Population Theory and China's Population* (in Chinese), December 1956.

[20] Yang Ssu-ying, "On the Malthusian Theory," *Hsueh Hsi*, October 2, 1955.

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Soviet Education—Four Studies

Nicholas DeWitt:
Soviet Professional Manpower, Its Education, Training and Supply,
National Science Foundation, Washington D. C., 1955.

Alexander G. Korol:
Soviet Education for Science and Technology,
Technology Press and John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 1957.

George S. Counts:
The Challenge of Soviet Education,
McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., New York, 1957.

George L. Kline (Ed.):
Soviet Education,
Columbia University Press, New York, 1957.

Reviewed by Norton T. Dodge

THESE FOUR STUDIES of Soviet education, though varying in scope and focus, contribute significantly to a keener appreciation of the fundamentally different function and purpose of education in a totalitarian system as compared with a democratic society.

Nicholas DeWitt, of Harvard University's Russian Research Center, whose book antedates the other three more recent volumes, has produced a broad, pioneering study of the Soviet educational system and its growth and development. Alexander Korol, a member of the research staff of the Center for International Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, presents a penetrating study of narrower scope concerning an area of Soviet education that is of particular interest at present. George S. Counts, educator and longtime student of Soviet affairs, focusses his attention primarily on the Soviet use of education as a weapon of political indoctrination. Finally, the volume edited by George L. Kline, of Columbia University, affords some interesting, though scattered, first-hand glimpses of the Soviet educational system, as recalled by eight former Soviet citizens.

Like every other form of state-directed activity in the Soviet Union, education is conceived as a weapon serving the interests of the Communist Party and dedicated to a single objective—the victory of the Soviet system. In furthering this aim, it has a two-fold task to accomplish. On the one hand, it must equip thousands of scientists and technicians with the skills and capacities necessary to assure the constant growth of Soviet economic and military strength. On the other, it must perform the function—vitally essential to the perpetuation of any totalitarian system—of inculcating in successive generations of Soviet citizens unquestioning dedication to the ideology and policies of the state.

Thus, under Communist totalitarianism, the development of the state is substituted for that of the individual as the primary goal of education. It is precisely this characteristic which fundamentally distinguishes Soviet educational policy and practice from those in democratic countries. As DeWitt points out (p. 1):

> **It is not the individual around whom the educational system is built, but the state, which, by identifying itself with pursuits of the common good, attempts the ruthless subordination of the individual—his rights, tastes, choices, privileges, and his training—to its own needs.**

This essential difference of educational purpose under communism and under democracy points up the inadequacy of trying to measure Soviet educational achievement by means of simple comparisons with Western academic training. While DeWitt, Korol and Counts all make such comparisons, they are

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Mr. Dodge is on the faculty of the Department of Economics at the University of Maryland (College Park, Md.). His study of Soviet postwar education has been enhanced by first-hand observation on a trip to the USSR in the summer of 1955.

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nevertheless more concerned with the basic question of how well Soviet education meets the needs of the Soviet system itself.

The most impressive achievement of the Soviet educational system has unquestionably been the rapid growth in the number of students trained. The present widespread acknowledgment abroad of Soviet achievement in this area is largely the result of DeWitt's study, which at the time it was published in 1955, provided the first comprehensive statistical measure of the progress of education in the USSR. With ingenuity and care, the author pieced together such fragmentary data as were then available from Soviet sources and derived from them estimated enrollment and graduation figures by year and by type of institution and training. It is a testimony to his thoroughness that, when the Soviet government later published its own compilation of educational statistics in *Kulturnoe Stroitelstvo SSSR* (Cultural Construction in the USSR), the estimates were found to be in close agreement. Much of the data contained in the Soviet handbook may be found in Korol's study, making it possible for the interested reader to compare the DeWitt estimates with the official figures.

THE STATISTICS show that there has been impressive growth at every level of the educational system. Total enrollment in regular primary and secondary schools almost tripled over the 25-year period beginning with the 1927–28 school year; the upper grades showed particularly impressive increases—ninefold in grades 5–7 and almost thirtyfold in grades 8–10. During the same period, technicum enrollment rose to more than 15 times its 1927–28 level. For the higher educational institutions, the increase was sixfold both in total enrollment of regular students and in the annual number of graduates. In addition, the number enrolled for correspondence study in the higher institutions—largely teachers seeking to improve their qualifications—has grown rapidly in the past decade and now amounts to one-half the regular enrollment. However, because of the lower graduation ratio for correspondence students, this added only 62,000 graduates to the 179,000 regular graduates in 1955.

The DeWitt and Korol studies also reveal the close correlation between changing state needs and relative enrollments for different types of training. Reflecting the acute demands of the industrialization program, enrollment for engineering study was predominant from the late 1920's until about 1937–38, when the main emphasis shifted to the training of teachers. At present, the state's requirements in the age of nuclear weapons and space satellites are reflected in the fact that engineers and university-trained natural scientists and mathematicians account for almost 40 percent of the regular graduates.

Such preoccupation with science and technology was possible, of course, only at the expense of other academic disciplines, particularly the humanities and social sciences, which are considered less essential to the development of Soviet economic and military strength. The sacrifice of Russian intellectual potentialities in these "non-essential" fields prompts Korol to write (p. 411):

The greatest tragedy of this century may well ultimately be that for 40 years successive generations of the Russian peoples, living in a country with enormous potentials in natural resources and possessing vigor, talent, and a rich spiritual heritage, for all the training they have so eagerly and grimly undergone, have been denied the privilege of education.

Genius can, and indeed must, transcend any educational system, but the average student faithfully reflects his educational environment. Consequently, although the latter may never publish anything or provide other clues to his capabilities, these may be judged fairly accurately through a careful evaluation of the quality of his training. Such an evaluation must encompass the entire educational system: the physical facilities, the teaching staff and methods, curricula, textbooks, examinations, etc. Both DeWitt and Korol undertake this ambitious and challenging task.

On the lowest level, *i.e.*, the "ten-year schools" (equivalent to US primary and secondary schools), physical facilities have been sufficiently expanded to relieve some of the strain. Only a few schools are now operating on three shifts; two-thirds, however, still require two shifts. Laboratory equipment appears to be adequate in the cities, though reports indicate that this is frequently not true of schools in the rural areas.

The ten-year school curriculum, influenced by the old Tsarist gymnasium and its German antecedents, has thus far been a demanding one. Formerly only a small percentage of students was expected to complete this training, and the bulk of the less capable were directed into technicums or vocational schools. Today, however, as ten-year education becomes more general, there are signs of some erosion of the curriculum, in the form of "politechnization"; and it is the humanities, rather than the sciences, which are yielding ground in favor of more vocational type courses. Also, a tendency has been reported to grade student performance less strictly to avoid excessive failures, resulting in a hidden deterioration of stand-

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ards. The fixed curriculum, syllabi and texts, however, limit the extent to which such practices are possible, and require a minimum level of achievement that is still quite high.

As far as the quality of teaching is concerned, one deficiency stands out particularly. Although a large proportion of the ten-year school teachers had their training in recent years, methods of instruction are reminiscent of the nineteenth century and stress learning by rote and mastery of detail rather than the development of independent thinking and creative ability. This "formalism in teaching and the pupils' knowledge" is accentuated by the examination system, under which the content of the questions is known in advance, permitting the students to regurgitate previously prepared answers. Still, the student who manages to graduate emerges with a very thorough grounding in rules, methods and techniques, as well as an impressive fund of factual information. As Korol puts it, "he may have gained considerable knowledge, if not an imaginative understanding."

HOW HIGH a place in the social and economic scale a Soviet youth can attain has become increasingly dependent upon his successful ascent of the academic ladder. Until recently, the ten-year school graduate could expect to continue on to higher education. Today, however, their number has so increased that the higher educational institutions can accommode less than one-fifth of the graduates as regular students, and perhaps another fifth as correspondence students. The majority, therefore, either must be diverted into technicums and other vocational training programs or enter industry without further preparation.

According to the Soviet press, however, many of those not admitted to the higher educational institutions or to vocational training have been reluctant to enter the labor force, and remain at least temporarily unemployed. These frustrated aspirants not only constitute an element of waste in the educational system but also have contributed to the increasingly serious youth problem of recent years. (See articles by A. Kassof and by S. V. and P. Utechin, *Problems of Communism*, May–June 1957.) Despite a growing concern with the situation, the regime has not yet found a solution.

A further problem arises from the keen competition among those entering higher education for admission to certain favored fields of study. As a result of strong incentives (more generous scholarship aid and the future prospect of greater prestige and financial rewards) offered in the fields enjoying high government priority, these fields attract a surplus of applicants, perhaps as many as a dozen candidates competing for each vacancy. Moreover, those who are not admitted must wait a year before reapplying to the same faculty or trying another, with the result that many students apply for a field in which they have little interest but where there is less competition. The unresponsiveness of the educational system to the desires of the students gives rise to frustrated careers and wasted talent. On the other hand, from the government's standpoint, the system does serve its purpose in providing the desired quantity of top-grade material for priority fields of study. In the physical sciences and select fields of technology, for example, there appears to be little outstanding talent missed.

What sort of education do the few who gain admission to the higher institutions obtain? During the past decade, unquestionably, some of the glaring deficiencies have been overcome. The quality of instruction is no longer likely to be impaired by shortages of properly-trained professors or of such physical facilities as classroom space, laboratory equipment and textbooks. However, in the matter of methods, certain defects still persist, one of which is the excessive burdening of students with class hours and other compulsory work. Soviet educational critics themselves have been urging a reduction of the 36 hours of required weekly class time to allow students more opportunity for independent study and thought. But despite these almost universal complaints from educational circles, the class load has not yet been materially lightened.

ANOTHER DEFECT plaguing university education is one inherent in the Soviet system of centralized control—a lack of flexibility in the curricula, syllabi and texts. Any changes not only must be approved by the Ministry of Education, but if approved become obligatory throughout the educational system. As a result, fruitful experimentation with curricula, course content and texts by individual professors or institutions is ruled out. During the period when the elevation of standards was a major concern, such uniformity may well have been necessary to ensure a minimum level of achievement; today, with standards more secure, it merely tends to discourage and frustrate the more original and creative minds. It is only in the most advanced courses, for which no syllabi can be prepared, that the professors are relatively free to teach as they please.

Despite these weaknesses at various levels of the educational system, both DeWitt and Korol view with respect the final results in the fields of science and engineering. Korol, who had the benefit of evalua-

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tions made by M. I. T. specialists of up-to-date Soviet curricula, syllabi, textbooks, examinations and other material, sums up his assessment of Soviet training in physics, for example, in the following terms (p. 357):

A Soviet physics undergraduate starts his course without any formal deficiencies from his secondary education; he pursues his highly concentrated, professionally oriented study for five long years; the university he attends, relative to other Soviet schools of higher education, has been least affected by the unhappy experimentation with curricula, methods, and objectives of training; his school commands relatively the best teachers, textbooks and facilities. As to the level of professional training, therefore, we would conclude that the Soviet physics graduate is at a par with, and in his particular area of specialization (one of ten options) perhaps at a higher level of professional preparation than, his American counterpart after one year of graduate training.

After completing his higher education the Soviet graduate is obligated to accept, for a three-year period, the specific job to which the state assigns him. Although his personal desires may receive some consideration, in the last analysis it is the state's needs which are decisive. The power to allocate jobs in this arbitrary manner is, of course, indispensable to the operation of a highly-centralized, planned economy, but it is at the same time a source of resentment and dissatisfaction among graduates whose personal desires and ambitions are in conflict with the objectives of the all-powerful state.

The other half of the dual task of Soviet education—the mass indoctrination of the people with Communist attitudes and beliefs—is the primary concern of the study by Counts. Additional insights into this aspect are provided by the first-hand reports of ex-Soviet citizens in the volume edited by Kline, which includes a revealing vignette of student life at a Soviet university and interesting accounts of teacher and engineer training. The value of these reports suffers, however, from the fact that all are based on experience prior to World War II.

From the first the Bolsheviks saw quite clearly that they faced the task of re-educating an entire people. Their almost naive confidence in the ability to transmute a conglomerate mass of human raw material into uniform replicas of the "New Soviet Man" was typified by Lunacharsky's boast that "we can mold a child of 5–6 years into anything we wish." Although hard-headed realists followed Lunacharsky as Minister of Education, the same grandiose aims

MANPOWER AND THE POWER OF THE STATE

The dimension that must above all be taken into account, if we are to understand the nature of the Soviet educational system, is the power of the Soviet dictatorship to allocate national resources, including intellectual resources, to its own ends. The degree of state control over manpower resources is exemplified by the obligation of every trained individual to work in a designated capacity and location for a number of years (in practical terms, indefinitely) after completing training.

Under Stalin, compliance with this requirement was substantially assured by the threat of direct punishment—a term in a forced labor camp. Under the "collective leadership," the harshness of enforcement has apparently been mitigated somewhat, with increased reliance being placed on exhortation and appeals to duty; and the many comments in the current Soviet press on the placement of graduates point to a considerable resistance on their part to accepting undesirable assignments. But graduates are still obligated to accept appointments. Despite Stalin's death and the subsequent relaxation of fear of police penalties, the statutory obligation of all graduates to take up designated work has been, to our knowledge, neither repealed nor modified; and it would be a mistake to believe—as Khrushchev would have the world believe—that the Soviet labor laws merely expressed Stalin's "cruelty." The need for compliance—if necessary, under a threat of extreme punishment—arises not from the qualities of individual leaders but inevitably from the logic of Communist philosophy and practice.

—From Alexander G. Korol's *Soviet Education for Science and Technology*, p. 401.

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continued to motivate Soviet educational policy and practice down to the present time.

In his chapters dealing with political and moral indoctrination, Counts describes in detail how the teaching of literature, languages, history and even the sciences has been fashioned to build "the foundations of a scientific Communist world outlook." Of these, history is the most important medium for the inculcation of Bolshevik political ideas. In the ten-year schools, instruction in the history of the USSR is heavily stressed because—in the words of the Minister of Education of the Russian federated republic (RSFSR)—it aids pupils "to understand the priceless significance of the achievements of the socialist revolution" and cultivates in them "the desire to devote all of their strength to continuing successfully the cause of their fathers—the building of a Communist society in the Soviet Union." At the university or institute level, all students, even in engineering, must study the history of the Communist Party, dialectical and historical materialism, and Marxist-Leninist political economy; and their views are further conditioned by party-directed student activities and organizations, as well as by the more general media of the press and cinema—indeed, by their whole environment.

IT IS PERHAPS unfortunate that neither Counts' study nor any of the others under review explores the question of how the Soviet utilization of the humanities and the social sciences as vehicles of Communist indoctrination has affected the quality of education in these fields. DeWitt and Korol are almost exclusively concerned with Soviet training in the natural sciences and technology, where ideological dogmatism and interference have been felt to a relatively small degree. Both authors recognize this as one of the major reasons for the greater vigor and progress in these areas.

Counts' silence on this aspect is explained, perhaps, by the fact that the catastrophic effects of Communist attempts to force ideological conformity upon literature, art and the social sciences are already so well known as to need little elaboration. Philosophy, history, economics, sociology, even biology and genetics—all have been so twisted to fit the mold of Soviet-type Marxist dogma that these disciplines no longer exist as areas of true scientific inquiry.

What does concern Counts is the vital question of whether the formidable machinery of indoctrination set up by the Soviet state has actually accomplished its goal of converting an entire people, as Lunacharsky so confidently boasted it would. In Counts' view, the answer to this question unhappily must be a qualified affirmative, but many observers would not fully share his pronounced pessimism. The observations of recent visitors to the Soviet Union, as well as scattered reports which have appeared in the Soviet press, provide substantial evidence of a growing ferment among the young intellectuals, and of the reawakening of a questioning and even critical attitude toward the Communist regime.

It is, of course, only in the past year or two that these currents of opposition have been able to come to the surface. During the last years of Stalin's regime, and even later, visitors to the Soviet Union invariably returned with the conviction that the massive weight of indoctrination and propaganda, coupled with long insulation from foreign contacts, had finally "brainwashed" the entire population. However, as soon as the grip of Stalinist terror was relaxed slightly, the facade of monolithic unity began to crack and hitherto latent doubts and dissatisfaction started to manifest themselves. The present reviewer witnessed this ferment in its incipient stage just three years ago.

To those who have lived as Soviet citizens and know from personal experience how far appearances can differ from reality in a totalitarian system, the recrudescence of signs of popular antagonism to the regime comes, perhaps, as less of a surprise than to many outside observers. The contributors to Kline's volume confirm that, even in the heyday of Stalinism, Soviet students remained inwardly sceptical of many aspects of Communist political belief, although forced to give outward acceptance and lip service. On the other hand, it certainly would be dangerous to assume that the outlook and attitudes of youth have not been warped to a considerable extent by long years of Communist indoctrination. In his sketch of Soviet university life for the Kline volume, for instance, H. G. Friese acknowledges (pp. 66–7):

At least one cardinal tenet of Marxism-Leninism was sincerely accepted by most university students, as well as ten-year school pupils, namely, that all preceding social systems, as well as present systems beyond the pale of Soviet socialism, were and are deeply unjust. . . . It was not merely the "scientific" criticism of Marx's *Capital* which convinced them of this, but also Russian literary works of the nineteenth century, including the writings of Gogol, Turgenev, Tolstoy, Goncharov, and Chernyshevski, and—among foreign authors—Schiller, Zola, and many others.

Moreover, even though the evidence of recent years indicates the existence in Soviet society of significant numbers of dissenters and non-conformists, it would be

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premature to conclude that their emergence necessarily presages the decay and eventual collapse of the Communist system. Both Counts and Korol warn particularly against the dangerous but quite common tendency in the West—which they see as a product of our own intellectual conditioning and heritage—to assume that the spread of education must inevitably accentuate the dissentient trends in Soviet society and thus pave the way for the ultimate triumph of liberty. Writes Korol (p. 415):

Consciously or unconsciously, we tend to endow any education with those ideals which are counted upon to contribute progressively to the well-being and quality of human society.

The Soviet system will doubtless evolve in a way unrelated to the experience of the West. Whether Count's pessimism will be justified or whether education, like a Trojan horse, will contribute to the ultimate destruction of Communist totalitarianism remains to be seen.

Khrushchev and Kremlinology

Myron Rush:
The Rise of Khrushchev
Public Affairs Press, Washington, D. C., 1957.

Reviewed by Daniel Bell

IN EXPLAINING the deterministic logic of deductive wit, Freud tells a story called "It Stands to Reason". An East European Jew sitting in a railway car observes a young man in the same compartment who is going, apparently, to the same, small village in which he lives. Puzzled as to the young man's intentions and identity, he begins to ruminate: "Only peasants and Jews live there. He is not dressed like either, but still, he is reading a book, so he must be Jewish. But why to our village? Only fifty families live there, and most are poor. Oh, but wait, Mr. Shmuel, the merchant, has two daughters: one of them is married, but for the other he has been seeking a husband. Mr. Shmuel is rich, and lately has acquired airs, so he would not want anyone from the village for *his* daughter. He must have asked the marriage broker to find a son-in-law from the outside. But Mr. Shmuel is old and cannot travel to meet a new family, so he would probably want a son-in-law from a family he knows. This means it would have to be one that had lived in the village but moved away. Who? The Cohen family had a son. Twenty years ago they moved to Budapest. What can a Jewish boy do there? Become a doctor. Mr. Shmuel would like a doctor in the family. A doctor needs a large dowry. The boy opposite is neat but not too well-dressed. Dr. Cohen. But in Budapest, Cohen wouldn't do. Probably changed his name. In Budapest? To Kovacs." As the train drew into the village station, the old Jew said to the young man: "Excuse me, Dr. Kovacs, if Mr. Shmuel is not waiting for you at the station, I'll take you to his home and introduce you to your betrothed." Replied the astonished young man: "How do you know who I am and where I am going? Not a word has passed between us." "How do I know," said the old man smilingly, "it stands to reason!"

The story is a long one, yet worth telling, for it illustrates the intrinsic wit and logic of Mr. Rush's book. His own chain of deduction began on a day back in 1955, when he observed in the May 25th issue of *Pravda* that Khrushchev's title as first secretary (*pervyi sekretar*) of the party suddenly appeared with the first letters of each word capitalized, as Pervyi Sekretar. Why the capitalization?—probably, ruminated Mr. Rush, to distinguish Khrushchev from all the thousand other "first secretaries" in the party, from the district level up, and thus to advance his

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Mr. Bell is Labor Editor of Fortune *magazine, New York, and a lecturer in sociology at Columbia University. As co-organizer (with David Footman) of the conference on Changes in Soviet Society, held at St. Antony's College, Oxford University, in June 1957, he prepared a paper on "The Prediction of Soviet Behavior in the Social Sciences," which appears in the current (Spring) issue of* World Politics.

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standing in the party. It was a change "so subtle and so elusive as virtually to have escaped notice in the West." [1]

From a clue as slim as this, and from others which at first glance might seem to be equally tendentious (*e.g.*, Khrushchev's use, just before Malenkov's deposition as premier, of the term *otriskoi* or "belching forth" to characterize the development of the Malenkov "right opposition," in recapitulation of Stalin's use of the word both in January 1935 following the assassination of Kirov, and in March 1937, unleashing the purge), Mr. Rush reasoned that Khrushchev was beginning to make a direct bid for power, that he would use Stalin's tactics to gain a controlling hand in the party, and that he would destroy the collective leadership. This prediction, which few could make confidently at the time, was embodied in some preliminary papers for the Rand Corporation, where Mr. Rush is a member of the Social Science Division, and was further elaborated in studies, completed in March 1957, which foresaw that Khrushchev would drive Malenkov, Kaganovitch and Molotov out of the Presidium. The early studies, dealing principally with the events from early 1955 through the Twentieth CPSU Congress of February 1956, form the bulk of this small volume.

IN SEEKING to recapitulate Stalin's rise, using the Secretariat as the power lever, Khrushchev was taking a big gamble. While Stalin had achieved absolute control mainly through intraparty manipulations in his role after 1922 as "general secretary" of the Central Committee, the title itself became dormant after 1934 and he came to be known simply as the *Vozhd*, or leader. In the war years and after, he chose to emphasize his governmental and military titles—chiefly his post as Chairman of the Council of Ministers—rather than his party position. And after Stalin's death Malenkov, as premier, chose his chief basis of support in the Council of Ministers, backed up by the ministerial and managerial bureaucracies (Rush assumes he had the choice of being party secretary or premier, and chose the latter). It is a measure of Khrushchev's shrewdness that he played his gamble on the assumption that, despite the rise of the technical and military groups, the mechanics of political power (that is, the leverage of the party) had not changed essentially since the 1930's.

Mr. Rush picks up the story in 1955, with the demotion of Malenkov. At this time, he argues, Khrushchev committed himself to the Stalin symbol. He not only used Stalin's method of building up power (*i.e.* packing the local secretariats), but identified himself with Stalin's heavy industry policy, used Stalin's phrases in characterizing the opposition, and, in a biography in the Encyclopedic Dictionary of March 1955, had himself described as "one of the closest" comrades-in-arms of Stalin. His chief problem was to legitimize the role of party "First secretary" as the initiating source of authority in the formulation of government policy—that is, to stake his claim to Stalin's power on the basis of having inherited the "general secretaryship" of the party.

KHRUSHCHEV'S OPPONENTS could follow one of two courses: either to compete for influence within the Secretariat, or to cloud the legitimacy of Stalin's title of general secretary and thus reduce the importance of Khrushchev's office as First Secretary. They chose the latter. Whether out of choice or necessity, we do not know. All through 1955, as Mr. Rush painstakingly traces the game, Khrushchev and his opponents played ducks and drakes with the Stalin symbol. The author presumes, for example, that anti-Khrushchev elements influenced the March 1955 article on Stalin in the Encyclopedic Dictionary (the same edition which carried Khrushchev's abovementioned biography): the article states that until the end of his life, Stalin was a secretary of the Central Committee, but after 1952 no longer general secretary—the point being that Stalin's post was not a normal party position but a prolonged even if necessary aberration. Nowhere else has there been evidence, says Rush, that Stalin's formal party title was changed in 1952. As another example, the author cites a statement by Petrovsky—an old comrade of Lenin and a former member of the Politburo, purged by Khrushchev in the Ukraine but rehabilitated after Stalin's death—who wrote in *Pravda* on the anniversary of Lenin's birthday, "Lenin taught us collectivity of work, frequently reminding us that all members of the Politburo are equal and the secretary is chosen for the fulfillment of decisions of the Central Committee of the party."

Khrushchev, on the other hand, sought to enhance the repute of Stalin's party post, and to identify himself with it. In October 1955, Khrushchev received a letter from New Zealand Deputy Prime

[1] The audacity of the step, presumably engineered by Khrushchev supporters, must have frightened the editors, for the next day the capital "S" was reduced, and thereafter Khrushchev was referred to as "Pervyi sekretar"—a tactical compromise on the road to power. It might be noted that the rare references in the past to Stalin as "general secretary" of the party Central Committee (see further in the text) were almost never capitalized.

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Minister Holyoake addressing him as "General secretary." Although the title was politically explosive, the letter was publicly released a month later and given wide publicity throughout the Soviet Union.[2] Some weeks afterward *Kommunist*, in an article commemorating Stalin's seventy-sixth anniversary, restored to the late leader his title as general secretary of the Central Committee.

And yet the opposition seemingly made some headway. Although in 1955 Khrushchev was making proposals to the Central Committee on his own authority, and not that of the Presidium, he seemed to feel the necessity of securing more support *within* the Presidium, and this was the tactic in which he was engaged just before the fateful Twentieth CPSU Congress held in February 1956.

Khrushchev's position at the opening of the Twentieth Congress was a powerful one. He had packed the Congress with his supporters. He gave the report of the Central Committee, interrupted speakers at will, behaved like the boss. Yet he made the extraordinary, secret speech which opened the Pandora's box of party history and which—if Mr. Rush's thesis holds—dramatically reversed his own attempts at self-identification with Stalin. Why?

IN ATTEMPTING to answer this question, Rush submits evidence that in the weeks before the Congress opened, some kind of battle was being fought behind the scenes relating to the Stalin issue. Stalin's name had virtually disappeared from the party press, and Khrushchev himself had muted his use of the symbol. Ten days before the sessions opened, the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers sent a greeting to Voroshilov on his seventy-fifth birthday, as tradition required; but where past letters to Soviet hierarchs always had cited them as "pupils of Lenin and coworkers of Stalin," in this instance the name of Stalin was conspicuously omitted. On the other hand, the very day before the Congress, *Pravda* published an article by Bierut, then secretary of the Polish CP, favorably invoking Stalin's name in connection with the policy of priority to heavy industry; this was the first reference to him in three weeks in the Moscow press.

Outside of Moscow, the divergences in press treatment of Stalin during this period were striking: in three republics, including Armenia, which is the home of Mikoyan, the press did not mention him; in five republics, including the Ukraine which is Khrushchev's power base, it did.

At the opening session of the Congress, there were four mentions of Stalin: Two were by foreign delegates (from France and China), praising him. Khrushchev, in his opening address, paid him marked if fairly brief and conventional homage. And then came Mikoyan's speech which—for the first time in a quarter-century—strongly criticized the late dictator. More than that, Mikoyan invoked the names of two men purged by Stalin, and called them comrades; one, pointedly, was Kossior, who had been Khrushchev's predecessor as party secretary in the Ukraine.

It is Rush's contention that Mikoyan's action forced Khruschchev's fantastic turnabout to an open attack on Stalin. Khrushchev's "secret" speech, he says, was unintended before the Congress and bears marks of hasty preparation—among them, a "major historical error" (a statement that no Lenin prizes had ever been awarded) which would have been corrected in a carefully prepared address. But why should Khrushchev have responded so precipitously to Mikoyan's challenge? Here Rush becomes somewhat vague. The reasons, he states, were two-fold: first, the need to cope immediately with Mikoyan's warning that the Stalin cycle of purge must not be repeated; and second, the incompatibility of Khrushchev's "venturesome foreign and domestic policy" with Stalinist dogma.

BOTH REASONS are somewhat unconvincing. The first is merely circular. If Khrushchev had the power at the Congress which Rush accords him, why then the need to cope with Mikoyan's warning? The second is even more puzzling. Why should long-range policy views suddenly have moved him to a hasty and an inevitably explosive action? Furthermore, Rush's explanation does not follow from his own careful account of the detailed use of the Stalin symbol by Khrushchev. In fact, his conclusion would be more convincing if one did not accept his highly deterministic analysis that every use of the symbol was a calculated move and countermove in the chess game of power, for in following it, we are unprepared for Khrushchev's turnabout. The difficulty is that while Rush has carefully plotted each of Khrushchev's moves, as deduced from the manipulation of symbols, he has failed to locate the exact opponents and to read their tactics. We are simply told that the "opposition" sought to counter Khrushchev. But the opposition, certainly, contained diverse groups with many rival and conflicting strategies. What these were we do not know. It may simply be that Rush overesti-

[2] A typographical error in the book gives the year as 1956, rather than 1955, which is unfortunate since the Holyoake letter was one of the early clues that prompted Mr. Rush's inquiries and is crucial to his argument.

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mates Khrushchev's power and that Khrushchev, in his need for support, made an out-and-out deal with Mikoyan on the spot. If this possibility is allowed, an analysis of symbols is of less importance than an assessment of actual power relations within the top leadership, and the former may even be deceptive.

If Rush's thesis has its weaknesses, he nonetheless has here the outlines of a major work on a key aspect of power: the problem of succession and the techniques of legitimization and investiture in a totalitarian system. And he demonstrates the talents for this type of work; the volume is an impressive testimonial to his energy, his attention to fact, and his use of detail to build up the plot. More is the pity, then, that he rushed into print—perhaps out of the desire to establish priority for his predictions—with a book which seems to be little more than the memoranda he originally prepared for Rand. The book is badly organized: themes are shuttled back and forth rather than ordered to build a coherent argument (an example is his scattered treatment of the fascinating history of the office of general secretary); important material appears as footnotes rather than in the text where it belongs. By opening precipitously with the events of 1955, the book lacks an historical setting (it is as if the story of Macbeth had opened after the murder of Duncan); surely the seeds of factional sproutings go back at least to the notorious "doctors' plot" of 1953, if not earlier. Beyond this the book hungers for more speculation: why, for example, did Malenkov, who had a longer history in party work than Khrushchev, give up the secretaryship and rely on the government apparatus; was he forced out, or was this a political gamble on his part?

MR. RUSH has given us a spirited example of "Kremlinology", the fine art of analyzing minutiae in order to predict the direction and outcome of the power struggle within the top Soviet elite. The reviewer, who is generally skeptical of such analyses, is almost convinced in this instance of the validity of the investigation, if not all of the specific interpretations put forward. Yet there still remains the gnawing doubt that human behavior, even among so highly self-conscious a group as the Bolshevik elite, is not as controlled as the Kremlinologists would have it. Their bent toward over-determinism is indeed akin to that in Bolshevik political logic which, in its lexicon, can never admit of chance: "it is no accident that . . .," "why at this *very* time," *etc.* They assume that an enormous apparatus, down to the provincial press, is continuously informed on the nuances of title and precedence, and directly controlled in their use—an assumption which, if true, must involve an extraordinary amount of coordination and a huge expenditure of time. The possibility is ignored that in the Soviet propaganda apparatus, as in any large and relatively sophisticated organization, people in the lower echelons play things "by ear," with a measure of accident and chance as the result.

A second, more difficult problem, if politics is analyzed largely in terms of power, is how to relate elite struggles to regime policies. This Mr. Rush has eschewed within the frame of his endeavor, but it is an issue which cannot be avoided. To what extent are Soviet policies opportunistic reflexes of power struggles? Is it possible to detect consistent factional attitudes on domestic and foreign matters (*e.g.*, is there a correspondence between an emphasis on heavy industry and a tough foreign line, or not)? These are crucial political problems which Western observers have to face.

Beyond this, there is a broader question at issue which has been posed most acutely by the British analyst Richard Lowenthal: that is whether Khrushchev's reassertion of party primacy over the economic bureaucracy—specifically his attempt to end the dualism of party and governmental power by installing the party hierarchs as the economic managers—may not be the last gasp of party domination.[3] If so, the succession after Khrushchev may not be decided at all by the type of tactical manipulation within the party and the agit-prop apparatus which Mr. Rush has detailed so well.

Yet, lacking the more normal evidence of political analysis, we cannot do without some Kremlinology. It is a necessary tool in these days "within the volume of which time [we] have seen hours dreadful and things strange." In the world of Macbeth, of plot and counterplot, the endless struggle for dark power can better be charted, sometimes, by attention to the nuances of precedence, of status and of title. It has been said that in the modern world gossip is a surrogate for intimacy; in the political game, Kremlinology is our form of gossip, and we cannot do without it.

[3] See Richard Lowenthal, "Party vs. State: The Permanent Revolution is on Again, *Problems of Communism*, No. 5 (Sept.-Oct.), 1957.

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Russians Under the Nazi Heel

Alexander Dallin:
German Rule in Russia, 1941–1945,
St. Martin's Press, New York, 1957.

Reviewed by Hans Kohn

MR. ALEXANDER DALLIN has written an exhaustive, and probably the definitive, study of German occupation policies in Soviet Russia during World War II. The book is distinguished as much by the impressive wealth of sources which the author has utilized as by the objective good judgment which he brings to the treatment of this controversial topic of recent history. It is of interest to students of communism for two particular reasons. First, while it is primarily an analysis of German policy, it necessarily includes a discussion of the attitudes of the various Soviet peoples toward their own Communist regime and their response to the German assault upon it. Second, in probing the workings of Nazi totalitarianism, it throws light upon the internal dynamics of any totalitarian system, whether Nazi or Communist.

The champions of totalitarianism have often boasted of its superior efficiency and cohesion as compared with democracy. There have been observers who twenty years ago credited the German National Socialist regime, and who today credit the Soviet Communists, with careful advance political planning and a thoroughly unified and coordinated execution of plans. However, Mr. Dallin's study confirms in detail, by the Nazi example, what many others have always suspected in totalitarianism—its inefficiency, its internal strains, feuds and fissures.

The Germans have long been known for their gift for methodical organization; yet the Nazi totalitarian dictatorship made no political preparation for the military campaign which it launched in 1941 against the Soviet Union. There were no high-level discussions of either the political or the economic problems that might confront the Nazi occupation. And since, in a totalitarian system, implicit trust exists in the wisdom of the leadership, no provision was made for its possible fallibility.

Faced with the shifting realities of the war itself, the various secondary echelons of the supposedly united leadership—united by Nazi Party discipline and ideology—clashed violently, so that Mr. Dallin can rightly speak of a kind of bureaucratic jungle warfare or authoritarian anarchy. "Rarely," he writes, "was so much effort in governing spent on so chaotic yet well-planned an orgy of mutual throat-cutting."

Mr. Dallin's analysis of Nazi policies aptly demonstrates another characteristic aspect of totalitarian systems. All totalitarianism is basically apolitical if we understand the essence of "politics" to be the pursuit of partial objectives by the limited means possible to man. Totalitarianism looks for total, uncompromising solutions in the conviction that everything is possible with dictatorial power; it may give the outward appearance of utmost pragmatic flexibility, yet it has unshakable, dogmatic faith in the basic truth of its doctrine. As a result it tends to overreach itself and thereby defeats its own aims.

This deepseated quality of their thinking makes it impossible for totalitarian leaderships to understand other peoples, and it explains why they are so prone to misjudge their adversaries' reactions. Such misjudgments contributed to the German downfall in Russia after the Nazi armies had scored sweeping initial successes. Mr. Dallin's study shows that the Reich was first unwilling, and later unable, to capitalize on the tensions existing in Soviet society—thus failing to turn to its advantage the moment when the entire matrix of Soviet internal control was gravely shaken by the crisis of arms and morale.

Under the blows of the German military machine, Soviet resistance seemed to crumble in the first months of war. A desire for independence promptly was aroused among the non-Russian nationalities under

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Mr. Kohn is Professor of History at City College of New York and author, among others, of Basic History of Modern Russia (*Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1957*).

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Soviet rule, and even more vital was the fact that there were many thoroughly patriotic Russians who were ready to take up arms against the Stalinist regime. The most important of these was General Andrei Vlasov, Commander of the Soviet Second Army, who, after surrendering to the Germans, urged the organization of a Russian anti-Stalinist movement.

Mr. Dallin presents a penetrating and convincing analysis of the character and importance of Vlasov and his movement. He shows that Vlasov was neither a seeker after political glory nor a purchasable hireling, and that he tried to convince the Germans that they must recognize and appeal to the Russians' strong national consciousness. The absence in the movement of any sympathy whatever for the Germans or the Nazi ideology was pointed out in a 1944 report by a German party official, who wrote:

The Vlasov movement does not feel bound to Germany . . . it has strong Anglophile sympathies . . . the Vlasov movement is not National Socialist . . . it is a diluted fusion of liberal and Bolshevik ideologies. It is important to know that it does not fight the Jews and it fails completely to recognize the Jewish problem as such.

The Germans failed to make any use either of the separatist national minority movements, which were strongest among the Ukrainians and the nationalities of Mohammedan faith, or of the Russian anti-Stalinists. The basic reason was that the National Socialist conceptual framework made German cooperation with "lesser peoples" unthinkable. Only in the last stages of the war, with defeat threatening, did a growing number of German Army commanders favor resort to psychological warfare in order to win the cooperation of disaffected elements of the Soviet population; indeed, even Nazi SS commanders then became willing to sponsor and absorb Slavic military units, something they had been totally unwilling to consider in 1941.

This more realistic attitude was explicit in a 1943 report sent in by the German Second Army, which stated, "We can master the wide Russian expanse which we have conquered only with the Russians and Ukrainians who live in it, never against their will." All recommendations of this nature by the field commanders, however, came too late to be acted upon successfully, even if they had been able to prevail against the still dogmatic stand of the Nazi leadership. Writes Mr. Dallin:

Germany could have had at its disposal the largest number of Soviet citizens of military age ever to emerge from under their government's control; yet of the millions of prisoners only a fraction was permitted to survive. Whatever their attitude toward the Soviet regime, after their experiences in German captivity, only a relatively small proportion saw their way clear to continue in the fight on the side of their captors.

Thus, in the end, Nazi totalitarian dogma and brutality proved Germany's undoing. The gravity of the mistake was underscored by the fact that, wherever the German army authorities did succeed in launching shortlived local experiments allowing the indigenous population some measure of administrative, cultural, and economic autonomy, the policy evidently brought large rewards. Not only did no calamities for the Germans ensue, but on the contrary the local population was generally inclined to work more wholeheartedly with the occupation forces.

It was the element of fanatical racism in the Nazi variety of totalitarianism which above all inhibited the Germans from making effective use of psychological warfare. They treated the peoples whom they considered racially inferior as sub-human scum—as *Untermenschen* destined to serve the Germans as their "natural masters." After the tide of war in the East had turned, the Nazi leadership still clung to its racist doctrine and even sought to exploit it in propaganda addressed to the Western allies of the Soviet Union. "The *Untermensch* has risen to conquer the world," declared a German propaganda appeal. "Defend yourself, Europe!"

With such a philosophy, there could of course be no equality for "subject" peoples, nor any inclination to train an intellectual leader class among them. "To teach the Russians, Ukrainians and Kirghiz to read and write would eventually be to our own disadvantage," Hitler declared. "Education will give the more intelligent among them an opportunity to study history, to acquire historical sense, and hence to develop political ideas which cannot but be harmful to our interests." In short, the conquered peoples were to be dealt with as "colonials" and deliberately kept in a state of backwardness and ignorance lest they develop ideas of political independence. The more perspicacious German observers noted that it was precisely the personal humiliation and indignity of being treated as inferiors, rather than economic hardship, which was most resented by the Soviet people under German occupation.

In the end, of course, it was this very attitude that made it easier for the Kremlin to rally its long-oppressed and dissatisfied subjects for a massive and heroic struggle against the German invader. This is one of the key points which emerge in Mr. Dallin's book and which help to make it one of the most important of recent volumes on contemporary history and totalitarian politics.

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